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Abstract 
The provision of expe!i testimony for the defence has been demonstrated to sensitise jurors 
to the variables that may reduce the reliability of an eyewitness identification (Cutler, 
Dexter, & Penrod, 1989). However, research examining the variables that reduce 
identification reliability has revealed con!licting findings (Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). Given 
this disparity in psychological opinion, a situation may arise where opposing expert 
testimony for the prosecution and the defence is delivered within the same criminal triaL 
This thesis examined the et1'cct of each form of expert testimony about eyewitness 
identification issues on the decision of the individual juror. The decision making process was 
divided into three stages. The tirst stage was delincd as the ability to draw accurate 
inferences about the credibility of the eyewitness, the accused, and the strength of the case 
tbr the prosecution and the defence. The second stage was defined as the ability to critically 
evaluate infbrmcttion that is presented about the eyewitness identification. The third stage 
was defined as the ability draw accurate judgements in relation to the reliability of the 
identification, and the verdict. Partic!pants (N== 1 04) constituted a sample of eligible jmy 
members within the general population. A trial transcript was delivered whereby the accused 
was charged with the armed hold-up of a service station. The crucial evidence constituted 
the positive identification of the accused by' the victim or the crime. Witnessing and 
identitication conditions were described as being conducive to a false identification. The 
expert witness l'or the prosecution submitted empirical evidence that portrayed the 
identilication as reliable. The expert witness for the dc!Cncc delivered equivalent information 
that portruycd the idcntiilcatio11 as lacking in reliability. Findings demonstrated that 
alternative modes or expert testimony ntiled to in!lucnce the type of decision formed by the 
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individual juror. Despite this finding of no difference, all subjects demonstrated an inability 
to fom1 accurate inferences in relation to the credibility oft he accused, and the strength of 
the case for the prosecution. Furthermore, all subjects t3.iled to demonstrate evidence for the 
critical evaluation of information presented in relation to witnessing and identification 
conditions. As a consequence, subjects were unable to form an accurate judge~ent in 
relation to the reliability of the identification. It is submitted that the provision of expert 
testimony for the prosecution, and the provision of expert (Cstimony for the defence, 
facilitates a juror scepticism etlCct. It is concluded that where evidence of a scepticism effect 
exists, the probability of wrungfully acquitting an otherwise guilty individual will 
substantially increase. 
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CHAPTER ONE - LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
The criminal justice system is ofien characterised as an infallible institution, 
structured by society's hierarchical leaders in order to protect the civil liberties of all 
individuals (Wells, 1986). Although the very concept of justice alludes to the impartial 
maintenance of proper societal norms, historical advances in applied eyewitne:>s testimony 
have served to shatter this apparent illusion (Wells, 1986). If the adversarial system of trial 
enables the imprisonment of innocent victims of misidentification, docs this not demonstrate 
inherent partiality, bias, and consequent injustice? Evidence to this effect would obviously 
constitute grounds for the abolition of current modes of trial, and the creation of new 
mechanisms by which justice could be ensured. Despite the obvious appeal of this notion, 
the founding premise upon which it is based i~ seriously flawed. Arc miscarriages of justice 
actually perpetuated by the mode of trial, or by the human participants who manipulate 
implemented procedural safeguards? Common sense would implicate human error as 
opposed to institutional inadequacy, thereby suggesting that it would be more feasible to 
rnould the Cll!Tent adversarial system into a form that is reconciled with the limited capacity 
of its human participants. It is within this domain that the discipline of psychology can offer 
c.onsidcrablc insight. 11_v examining the functional roles of each human participant (namely 
the police, judges, and juries), psychologists may isolate the various factors which may lead 
to wrongful convictions, whilst suggesting appropriate strategies for the reformation of 
procedural saf'cguards against the same. As each justice system participant constitutes a 
separate unit or analysis, this thesis shaH concern itself with the tendency for juries to be 
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insensitive to eyewitness identification issues, whilst advancing a method for empirically 
examining the validity of reforming current court procedure. 
The Nature of the Problem 
How many individuals are wrongly convicted on the basis of eyewitness 
testimony that lacks both validity and reliability? Although statistics are not available for 
perusal, any brief analysis of criminal case law serves to emphasise the extent of wrongful 
convictions. An historical example is evident when considering the case of Davies. v. The 
King, and Cody. v. The King (1937)- both of whom were convicted of murder and 
sentenced to death on the basis of eyewitness testimony. During the process of appeal it was 
detennined that the method of identification employed by the police was highly suggestive 
m nature, thereby rendering subsequent positive identifications questionable 
(Commonwealth Law Reports, 1937). As the jury was not warned of the problems 
associated with eyewitness Testimony, the court or criminal appeal quashed the conviction, 
thereby ordering a new trial (Commonwealth Law Reports, 193 7). Any brief analysis of this 
outcome might lead the reader to formulate a seemingly obvious assumption- if the jury is 
instructed as to the dangers inherent within eyewitness testimony, then the probability of 
wrongft1l conviction is markedly diminished. Despite the apparent feasibility of this rationale 
extensive research within the domain of psychology has served to render this assumption 
highly questionable in nature. Jury members consistently convict an accused when erroneous 
identification evidence is successtl11ly impeached by the defence counsel (Loftus & Doyle, 
1992). Why do jury members attribute undue weight to this mode of evidence? Are jury 
members aware of the mechanisms responsible for both the fallibility and the malleability of 
the ;mman mcmmy? Even ifjmy llll~mbers demonstrate an understanding of such variables, 
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do they draw upon such knowledge when determining issues of fact? Or are they more 
inclined to rely on heuristic based processing that essentially serves to increase the 
propensity for errors in judgement? Unfm1unately, the current state of psychological 
research suggests that the jury is an inherently biased institution, completely insensitive to 
eyewitness idcntitlcation issues (Loftus & Doyle, 1992). 
Given the human tendency to rely on biased processing strategies, the view 
expressed by Lotlus and Doyle ( 1992) appears fairly conclusive. However, this conclusion 
may be somewhat premature and requires further elaboration. During the process of trial, 
the prosecution counsel assumes the burden or proving (beyond a reasonable doubt) that the 
accused is actually the perpetrator of the crime (Gi!lies, 1987). Where the primary source 
of evidence constitutes the positive identification ol'the accused by the victim of the crime, 
an extensive examination of the reliability of that identification is warranted. When 
examining the reliability of an idcntilication, what cl~ments require consideration? 
Researchers have identified several categories of variables that serve to distort the memory 
of the eyewitness - those being estimator variables and system variables (Wells, 1978). 
Estimator variables are those factors that occur at the time an event is witnessed - although 
they arc beyond the control ofjustice system participants, they "may be useful in evaluating 
the quality of the eyewitness account,, (Lof1us & Doyle, \992, p 12). Some examples 
constitute poor lighting conditions, sh0rl exposure times, extremely high or low levels of 
stress, expectations, and gender (Lotlus & Doyle, 1992). In contrast, system variables are 
those H1ctors that occur during the process of investigating the crime, and are therefore 
under the direct control of justit;c system participants (Lotlus & Doyle, 1992). Some 
examples constitute long retention intervals, post-event information, extensive mugshot 
viewing prior to an identitication, unconscious transference, and biased line-up formations 
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(Loftus & Doyle, 1992). There is now a multitude of research elucidating juror insensitivity 
to the operation of estimator and system variables - when evaluating the reliability of an 
eyewitness identification, jUly members are more inclined to attribute undue weight to more 
extraneous elements (such as eyewitness confidence) that are by no means correlated with 
eyewitness accuracy (Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981; Yanney & Tressillian-Jones, 1983; 
Cutler, Penrod, & Stuve, 1988; and Cutler, Dexter, & Penrod, 1991). 
A Solution to the Problem 
The Provision of Expert Testimony for the Defence 
Is it possible to mould the current advcrsarial system into a form that is 
reconciled with this limited c<J.pacity of triers of Htct? In an attempt to sensitise jurors to the 
potential confOunding impact of estimator and system variables, a number of researchers 
have advocated the provision of expert psychological testimony for the defence (Loftus, 
1980; Cutler, Dexter & Penrod, 1989; Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1989). It is generally 
anticipated that the provision of information in relation to witnessing and identification 
conditions would serve to educ:-.tc the jLuy, and f..1cilitate the critical evaluation of 
eyewitness identification issues (Cutler, Dexter, & Penrod 1991 ). Proponents of this view 
base their assertions on ideological considerations which form the conceptual foundations 
of a system committed to the fair dispensation of justice. The identification of practises 
which pr(~servc existing institutional bias, and compound the likelihood of wrongful 
conviction, have shaped the directions and lOcus of psycho-legal research within the last 
decade. !Iowcvcr, any rc!Orm to the procedural practices of the justice system requires an 
extensive analysis of costs and bcnclits in terms of the larger community. If expert testimony 
for the defence yields the anticipated outcome, a reduction in wrongful convictions would 
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be evidenced. However, a related concern expressed by Wells (1986) is whether such an 
outcome impacts adversely on the general community. An t~qunlly important consideration 
when addressing issues of reform involves the need to address the probability of wrongfully 
acquitting an otherwise guilty individual. As the notion of community welfare should be 
analysed in conjunction \Vith the assurance of ju~tice, these issues require extensive 
consideration. 
Prior to fOrmLJ!ating an opinion in relation to this ideological issue, the effects 
of expert testimony for the defence on the decision making capabilities of the individual 
juror must be assessed and analyseri. Researchers who advocate the provision of expert 
testimony anticipate one of three potential outcomes - that of juror sensitivity, juror 
confusion, or juror scepticism (Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1989). According to Cutler et al 
( 1989) juror sensitivity constitutes a knowledge of the potential confounding int1uence of 
witnessing and identi!ication conditions, and the ability to integrate this knowledge in a 
manner that enables the critical evaluation of eyewitness testimony. In contrast, juror 
confusion constitutes the tendency to "misinterpret, overgeneralise, or misapply the 
information presented by the expert" (Cutler et al, 1989, p312). The final potential outcome 
in relation to the provision of expert testimony refers to juror scepticism - the tendency to 
rely upon expert opinion, "whilst undervaluing the \veigh! of additional eyewitness evidence11 
(Cutler ct al, 1989, pJ 14). Should expert testimony yield outcomes that are consistent with 
the juror confusion or the juror scepticism hypothesis, the probability of wrongfully 
acquitting an otherwise guilty individual would substantially increase - an obviously 
unclcsir::~ble outcome in terms of community well being (Wells, 1986). If psychologists are 
to argue the cllkacy of expert testimony, it must be demonstrated that the presentation of 
such testimony facilitates a level of juror sensitivity (Cutler eta\, 1989). The cognitive 
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processes that are characterised by a sensitivity effect (namely the critical and elaborate 
analysis of relevant information), would ultimately serve to reduce the effects of juror bias. 
The outcomes envisaged by an application of this fOrm of processing is a reduction in 
wrongful convictions. Where an accused appears guilty - elaborate processing should also 
lead to a reduction of wrongful acquittals. Such outcomes are highly desirable and ensure 
both the protection of the community at large, and the civil liberties of each accused person. 
Early Research - Expert Testimony for the Defence 
Research examining the impact of expert testimony for the defence may be 
categorised in terms of the experimental paradigm developed for analysis. Early research 
within this domain ntternpted to assess the etfect of expc11 testimony where witnessing and 
identification conditions were conducive to a false identification (Wells, 1986). It was 
anticipated that the analysis of trial outcome would provide adequate evidence for a juror 
sensitivity eftCct. Despite the pioneering nature of research within this domain, Wells ( 1986) 
offers a word of caution. Where a reduction in the rate of conviction is facilitated by the 
provision of expert testimony, a sensitivity effect is not necessarily implied. It is equally 
plausible to assume the operation of a juror confusion, or a juror scepticism effect. If jury 
members unconditionally accept information that is delivered by a soJrce of expertise, a 
juror scepticism etfect may be implicated. As juror sensitivity is characterised by the critical 
and elaborate analysis of relevant information, researchers must develop an experimental 
paradigm that incorporates two inextricably linked dependent measures- that of the process 
by which jurors reach individual verdicts, and trial outcome (Wells, 1986). This enables the 
consecutive assessment ofjuror sensitivity, juror confusion, and juror scepticism effects. 
The first empirical analysis of the effect of expert testimony on trial outcome 
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was conducted by Loftus ( 1980). Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two 
experimental cooditions - an expert testimony present condition, and an expert testimony 
absent condition. All subjects read a trial transcript depicting the assault of an army officer, 
and were required to render a verdict in relation to guilt or innocence. The case for the 
prosecution was ultimately dependent upon the positive identification of the accused by the 
victim of the crime. Across experimental conditions, results demonstrated that the provision 
of expert testimony "significantly reduced the proportion of guilty verdicts from 57.5% to 
39%" (Lot1us, 1980, p\2) Lotlus (1980) tentatively suggests that the provision of expert 
testimony "prompts the jurors to murc carefully scrutinise the eyewitness account, and to 
consider the possibility that it may be mistaken- perhaps it raises reasonable doubt'' (Lofius, 
1980, p 13 ). When considering the words of caution delivered by Wells ( 1986), the feasibility 
of this conclusion is questionable When analysis is con tined to the dependent measure of 
trial outcome, it is not possible to din'crcntiate between the operation ora juror confusion, 
a juror scepticism, or a juror sensitivity efTect (Wells, 1986). 
Within a sirn;lar experimental design, Hosch, Beck, and Mcintyre (1980) 
randomly assigned subjects to one of two experimental conditions ~ an expert testimony 
present condition, and an expert testimony absent condition. At the conclusion of 
experimental manipulations, subjects were required to engage in the deliberation process, 
nnd render n verdict or guilt or innocence. Findings demonstrated that verdict delivered was 
not altered as a li.mction of the provision of expert testimony - all subjects tended to acquit 
the accused. Despite this notion, the provision of expert testimony was demonstrated to 
f~1cilitatc increased attention to the eloments that may have adversely influenced the 
identification of the accused (estimator and system variables). In addition, increased 
attention to pertinent trial evidence was observed. Such findings provide the first indication 
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of the effect of expert testimony on the processes by which jurors reach a verdict. If 
information presented to jurors is carefully and critically evaluated, the operation of a 
sensitivity effect is implied. In this manner, the probability of wrongful conviction is 
diminished. 
Despite the progress implied by analysing the etTect of expert testimony on 
the jury deliberation process, a c1itical issue appec:.rs to have escaped the attention of critics. 
Loilus ( 1980) and Hosch et al ( 1980) failed to clarify if poor witnessing and identification 
conditions were varied orthogonally. As an analysis or reported tindines suggests that they 
were not, it proves necessary to o!l'cr an additional word of caution. Jn cases where the 
primary source of evidence constitutes the positive identification of the accused, the 
reliability of that identi!ication (in terms of witnessing and identification conditions) requires 
extensive examination. Where expert testimony is excluded from proceedings, the adverse 
operation of esti111ator and system variables should be addressed by the defence counsel 
when subjecting the eyewitness to a cross-examination. When an expert witness appears on 
behalf of the defence, empirical cvidence is submitted that serves to reinfOrce the elements 
raised by the defence counsel. !!'the adverse impact or estimator and system variables is 
excluded when cross-examining the eyewitness in control conditions, it could be argued that 
this body or research is not nctual\y measuring the eifcct of expert testimony - it is 
measuring the e!lCct of additional information on the decision making capabilities of the 
individual_iuror As a consequence, it is not too surprising that those in receipt of expert 
testimony l(w the defence, aiT11rdcd con:.,derably more attention to the discussion of relevant 
trial evidenr:c. 
If the lindings reported by Loftus (1980) and Hosch et a\ (1980) are 
indicative of a sensitivity effect, an ability to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate 
Expert Testimony 9 
eyewitness testimony should be evidenced. Wells, Lindsay, and Tousignant (1980) 
attempted to determine if infOrmation offered by an expert witness increased this 
discriminatory ability of the JUry. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two 
experimental conditions- a witnessing conC.ition and a juror condition. Subjects within the 
witnessing condition were re-assigned to one of three experimental conditions (a low, 
moderate, or high, accuracy of identification condition). At the conclusion of condition 
assignment, witnes~ing su\Jjects were ~xposed to staged thefts that were designed to 11yield 
low, moderate, or high proportions of correct identi!kations of the thier• (Lindsay et al, 
1971, p79). Each subje~.:t was required to identity the perpetrator within a photographic line-
up. Eight accurate subjects, and eight inaccurate subjects were then subjected to a cross-
examination. Subjects within the juror condition were re-assigned to one of four 
experimental conditions - an expert testimony present condition (with an accurate 
eyewitness or an inaccurate eyewitness), or an expert testimony absent condition (with an 
accurate eyewitness or an inaccurate eyewitness). All juror subjects were then exposed to 
video tapes depicting the cross-examination of the eyewitness, and the expert witness where 
applicable. Results demonstrated that th~ provision of expert testimony failed to "increc.se 
subject-jurors' abilities to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate witnesses to a given 
crime" (Wc!ls et a!, 1980, p282). Such results fail to provide the most critical evidence for 
a sensitivity effect. II' expert testimony tOr the defence fails to increase the discriminatory 
ability of the jury, the potential benefits to be obtained from admitting such testimony 
become questionable. ln conjunction with the notion or sensitivity, this analysis fails to 
eliminate the potential operation of a juror conlhsion, or a juror scepticism effect. 
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Current Research - Expert Testimony for the Defence 
Early research examining the effect of expert testimony for the defence fails 
to demonstrate beneficial m:tcomcs in terms of juror sensitivity. Given the inability to 
eliminate the operation of juror scepticism and juror confUsion effects, Cutler, Penrod, an•-
Dexter ( 1989) developed an experimental paradigm that enabled the consecutive assessment 
of juror sensitivity and juror scepticism. It was determined that three independent variables 
should be subjected to manipulation - witnessing and identification conditions (which 
implied a fillse as opposed to positive identification of the accused), eyewitness confidence 
(where the eyewitness was 80% as opposed to 100% confident in the accuracy of the 
identification), and expert testimony (which was present or absent). When systematically 
manipulating such variables.. juror sensitivity as a function of expert testimony should 
manifest in increased co!lvictions where witnessing and identification conditions are fair, 
reduced convictions where witnessing and idcr'tification conditions are poor, and a reduced 
tendency to re!y on eyewitncs." confidence as a determinant of eyewitness accuracy (Cutler 
et a!, 1989). In contrast, juror scepticism as a function of expert testimony should manifest 
in an increased tendency to acquit the accused (irrespective of' the nature of witnessing and 
identification conditions). The scepticism hypothesis .s justified by Cutler et al ( 1989) in the 
fOllowing manner- "jurors may understand the expert's basic view (i.e., identifications can 
be inaccurate) without considering the specific points of the expert's testimony regarding 
witnessing and identification conditions" (Cutler et a!, 1989, p216). It was anticipated that 
the systematic manipulation of such variables would enable a thorough examination of the 
effect of expert testimony for the defence on the decision making capabilities of the 
individual juror. 
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When considering the manner in which witnessing and identification 
conditions should be systematically varied, the problems associated with the presence or 
absence of expert testimony are inadvertently eliminated. Cutler eta! (1989) suggest that 
twenty estimator and system variables should be acknowledged within each experimental 
condition- ten of which should be described as adversely influencing the reliability of the 
identification (where witnessing and identilication conditions arc poor), all'J ten of which 
should be described as not adversely influencing the reliability of the identification (where 
witnessing and identitlcation conditions arc t:1ir) (Cutler et al, 1989). When varying the 
nature of witnessing and identi!ication conditions in an orthogonal manner, the control 
group is automatically provided with equivalent information. Where expert testimony is 
pres~nt, information in relation to twenty witnessing and idcntitlcation conditions is 
delivered by the defence counsel during the cross-examination of the eyewitness. In 
accordance with the experimental condition, ten of these variables are described in a manner 
that alludes to identification reliability, or a lack of identification reliability. These :;amc ten 
variables arc reinforced by the expert witness when submitting empirical evidence towards 
the conclusion of the triaL Where expert testimony is absent, the defence counsel raises the 
same twenty issues when subjecting the eyewitness to an extensive cross-examination. Ten 
of these variables are described in a manner that ,;lludes to identitication reliability. or a Jack 
of identitication reliability. In this manner, the provision of expert testimony can be 
described ,'ls the rcin!lxcenwnt ofrelcvnnt information in relation to the operation often 
estimator and system variables. 
Cu1lcr, Dexter, and Penrod ( 1989) were the first to use this experimental 
paradigm in an analysis ol' the effect or expert testimony on the decision making processes 
of the individual juror. When systematically vatying witnessing and identification conditions, 
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the following variables were identified- a disguise (was or was not worn by the perpetrator), 
a weapon (was or was not visible during the robbery), the identification (was conducted two 
days after the robbery, or two weeks after the robbery), and line-up instructions (provided 
a no-choice option, or excluded a no-choice option (Cutler et a\, 1989). All subjects were 
exposed to a video tape of a simulated trial, whereby the accused was charged with the 
armed hold-up of a liquor store. The primary evidence led on behalf of the prosecution 
constituted the positive identification of the accused by the victim of the r~rime. Subjects 
were required to render a vcrdicl of guilt or innocence, rate the credibility of the eyewitness, 
and indicate the strength of the case for the prosecution and th0 defence. The findings 
repm1cd by Cutler ct a! ( 1989) demonstrate that the provision of expert testimony reduces 
the tendency of the jury to rely on eyewitness contidence as a determinant of eyewitness 
accuracy. When the eyewitness was described as being 80% as opposed to I 00% confident 
in the accuracy of the identification, credibility ratings assigned to the eyewitness did not 
reduce. In addition, witnessing and idcnti!ication conditions were described as significantly 
influencing ratings of strength assigned to the case for the prosecution and the defence. 
Where witnessing and identit!cation conditions were conducive to a false identification, 
ratings as to the strength orthc defence case increased - where witnessing and identification 
condition~ were optimal for identification, ratings as to the strength of the prosecution case 
increased. While a !I eftects on verdict delivered were non-signilicant, Cutler et a! ( 1989) 
mmntain that "the results provide justilication for expert testimony in eyewitness cases. 
Without such testimony, jurors appear unkowledgeable of eyewitness problems. 
furthermore, there is nu evidence to suggest a scepticism e!Tect" (Cutler eta\, I 989, p223). 
It is argued that the conclusions reached by Cutler ct a\ ( 1989) are somewhat erroneous. 
The findings reported by Cutler ct a! (I 989) fail to provide evidence for a 
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sensitivity effect, and do not completely eliminate the operation of a juror scepticism effect, 
or a juror confusion effect. Where the provision of expert testimony fails to influence verdict 
type, jury members are demonstrating an im.bility to draw appropriate conclusions from 
information that is presented. It could be argued that finding provides evidence for a juror 
confusion effect. Jfjury members become confused when critically evaluating information 
presented by the expert, the probability of forming an accurate judgement in relation to 
verdict is no greater that chance alone (thereby justifying the nonNsignificant finding in 
relation verdict type). An equally plausible consideration is the operation of a juror 
scepticism ctTCct. lfjurors arc too willing to accept the opinion of the expert witness for the 
defence, a grea1cr proportion of acquittals would be evidenced (irrespective of the nature 
ofwitnessin~ c~nJ identification conditions). As the lindings reported by Cutler eta! (1989) 
fail to eliminate these potential eflCcts, it is not possible to tC'nder a conclusion in relation 
to beneficial nature of expert testimony for the defence. 
In the same year, Cutler, Penrod, and Dexter ( 1989) attempted to examine 
"how, and at what cognitive stages expert testimony affects juror decision making" {Cutler 
et al, \989, p315). The decision making process was divided into three stages - that ofjuror 
knowledge, juror inference, and juror judgement. The tlrst stage was defined as a knowledge 
of the adverse in!luence of estimator and sysrem variables. The second stage was described 
as the ability to draw appropriate inferences in relation to the credibility of the eyewitness, 
and the strength of the C3SC fOr both the prosecution and the defence. The t1nal stage within 
the decision making process \vas identified as judgements in relation to the accumcy of the 
identification, and the !ina\ verdict warranted. It was anticipated that expert testimony would 
provide adequate infOrmation concerning the nature of estimator and system variables. This 
would enhance the ability to fOrmulate accurate inferences, which would subsequently 
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increase the reliability affinal judgements (Cutler eta!, 1989). To enable the examination 
of this proces..'->, three independent va1iables were subjected to manipulation- witnessing and 
identification conditions (poor as opposed to fair), eyewitness confidence (80% as opposed 
to I 00% contldent in the accuracy of the identification), and expert testimony (where 
subjects were provided with the opportunity to hear an expert witness reinforce the 
infOrmation delivered by the de!"encc counsel, or were not provided with this opportunity) 
(Cutler et aL 1989). All subjects were exposed to a video tape depicting a simulated trial. 
The case for the prosecution was dependent on the positive identification of the a{.;cused by 
the victim of the crime. The results reported by Cutler et al ( J 989) shall be described in 
accordance with each stage within the decision making process. 
Stage one of the decisioll making process was identified as knowledge of 
estimator and system variables. Cutler et al ( 1989) demonstrated that jurors were "aware 
that disguise, retention interval, and line-up instructions all have appreciable effects on 
identification accuracy, but jurors were unaware of the elTccts associated with weapon 
visibility ... and eyewitness confidence" (Cutler ct al, 1989, p323). The provision of expert 
testimony for the defence improved juror knowledge in relation to the impact of such 
variables (Cutler ct al, 1989). 11 could be argued that such conclusions arc not adequately 
justitied in terms of experimental outcomes. The manner in which findings arc reported 
alludes to the notion of a pre-existing knowledge in relation to the impact of estimator and 
system variubh.!s. This particular rationale is somewhat inaccurate. Such findings merely 
imply that the defence counsel is able to communicate the effects of disguise, retention 
intetval, ::md line-up instructions, in a manner that is understandable to the jury (when 
conducting the cross-examination of the eyewitness). However, the defence counsel is 
unable to communicate the effects of weapon visibility and eyewitness confidence. When an 
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expert witness clarifies ~he operation of such variables, juror understanding is facilitated. 
This outcome implies that the defence counsel is an adequate source of infonnation in 
relation to the less complicated estimator and system variables. Where complex variables are 
present, the expert witness tbcilit,1tes juror understanding to a greater degree. 
Stage two of the decision making process was defined as the ability to draw 
inferences in relation to the credibility of the eyewitness, and the strength of the case for the 
prosecution and the defence (Cutler et al, 1989). It was determined that the "provision of 
expert testimony increased jurors reliance on estimator and system variables when drawing 
inferences" (Cutler et at 1989, p324). Such findings clearly emphasise the efficacy of the 
expert witness as a means of communicating intbnnation. Perhaps the defence counsel is not 
afforded the requisite sense of impartiality when delivering equivalent intbrmation. As the 
defence counsel is assigned the responsibility of defending the accused (irrespective of 
beliefs in relation to guilt or innocence), it appears feasible to conclude that a level of 
partiality would be assumed. The final stage of the decision making process was identified 
as the ability to form judgements in relation to the accuracy of the identification, and the 
verdict warranted (Cutler et al, 1989). It was determined that "jurors were more likely to 
judge the identification as accurate in the good witnessing and identification condition rather 
than the poor...(fUiihennore) ... witnessing and identification conditions had a large influence 
on jurors' judgerne;Hs if the expert testified, but a negligible impact if no expert testified" 
(Cutler et al, 1989, p325 ). In addition, "more convictions were obtained where witnessing 
and identi!icallon cunditions were good" (Cutler eta\, 1989, p325). Such findings provide 
the most compelling evidence for a sensitivity eOCct as a fi.mction of the provision of expert 
testimony The cxpe11 witness appears to deliver infOrmation in a manner that facilitates the 
level of clarity required in order to lbrmulate a reliable judgement in relation to the accuracy 
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of the identification, and the final verdict warranted. In such instances, the potential 
operation of a juror confusion, and a juror scepticism effect is eliminated. 
Prior to advocating the provision of expert testimony for the defence within 
the context of the adversarial system of trial, current research emphasises the necessity to 
examine the effect of alternative sources of infOrmation on the decision making capabilities 
of the individual juror. When exploring the validity of the concerns that have been 
emphasised by Brekke, Enko, Cia vet, and Seclau ( 1991 ), the justification for such research 
appears self evident in nature. A psychologist may offer testimony within the context 0fthe 
courtroom anticipating that the contents of such testimony would be delivered in an 
impartial manner (Brekke et a\, \991 ). This means of providing information would facilitate 
the required level of understanding in relation to the eflect of estimator and system variables. 
When considering the adversmial nature of trial by jury, it could be argued that this outcome 
is somewhat idealistic. In essence, the very nature of the adversarial system "encourages 
partiality on the part of experts, and fosters the development of professional experts and 
hired guns" (Brekke et al, 1991, p452). Such potentiality would serve to diminish the level 
of credibility atTordcd to the psychological profession, and encourages the notion of 
scepticism in relation to psychological tlndings (Brekke et al, 1991 ). It has been suggested 
that an ctticicnt means by which to avoid this potential constitutes the provision ofnon-
adversarial forms or expert testimony (Brekke et aL 1991 ). Would judicial instmction in 
relation to vvitncssing and identitication conditions, or a court appointed expert witness for 
the ddCncc, serve to foster an equivalent level of juror sensitivity to witnessing and 
identification conditions'1 
In an examination of this notion, Cutler, Dexter, and Penrod (1991) 
attempted to explore the c!Tect of nonMadversarial forms of expert testimony (the court 
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appointed expert, or judicial instruction) on the decision making processes of the individual 
juror. Three independent variables were subjected to manipulation - witnessing and 
identification conditions (poor as opposed to fair), eyewitness confidence (80% as opposed 
to 100% confident in the accuracy of the identification), and expert testimony (the contents 
of which were delivered by the defence counsel when conducting the cross examination of 
the eyewitness, and reinforced by an adversarial expert, a court appointed expert, the 
presiding judge, or no expert) (Cutler et al, 1989). The adversarial expert delivered 
testimony on behalf on the defence from the witness box. Empirical evidence was submitted 
that described the effect of estimator and system variables- this was delivered prior to the 
closing statements of the defence and the prosecution counsel. The non-adversarial expert 
appeared on behalfofthe court and delivered testimony whilst standing in front of the judge. 
The content of the testimony was equivalent to that delivered by the adversarial expert. 
Where judicial instruction was incorporated, the judge recited the Telefair (1972) 
instructions indicating the dangers inherent within eyewitness testimony. This was delivered 
when instructing the jury as to their deliberation task at the conclusion of the trial. All 
subjects were exposed to video tapes depicting a simulated trial. The primary evidence led 
on behalf of the prosecution constituted the positive identification of the accused by the 
victim of the crime (Cutler et al, 1991 ). Results demonstrated a scnsitisation effect when an 
adversarial expert delivered information, and a scepticism effect when non-adversarial 
experts delivered information (Cutler et a!, 1991 ). The justification for such findings shall 
be described belO\v. 
Cutler ct al (1991) claim to have provided additional evidence for a 
sensitivity c1Tect as a function of the provision of adversarial sources of infOrmation. It is 
suggested that such findings provide considerable insight into the manner in which expert 
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testimony selVes to optimise the decision making processes of the individual juror. Why did 
non-adversarial sources of information facilitate a scepicism effect? Cutler et al (1991) 
suggest that the elaboration likelihood model of persua~ion (1986) provides an adequate 
theoretical model from which to conceptualise the effects of non-adversarial sources of 
information. Findings demonstrated that non-adversarial sources of information were 
aftbrded considerably higher ratings of credibility than adversarial sources of information 
(Cutler eta\, 1991 ). Petty and Cacioppo ( 1986) imply that high levels of source credibility 
may reduce jurors motivation to critically evaluate the infOrmation that is presented. When 
a source of information is presumed to be credible, jurors may consider that the risk 
associated with accepting the opinion of the expert is minimal. In this manner, little effort 
is expended in the critical evaluation oft he contents of the information provided. Where an 
expert is assigned lower ratings of credibility, jurors become motivated to carefully evaluate 
the contents of the argument- the risk associated with accepting the opinion of the expert 
is considerable. In this manner, adversarial forms of expert testimony facilitate the critical 
evaluation of relevant information, whilst non-adversarial tbrms of expert testimony foster 
the unconditional acceptance of information delivered by a more credible source (Cutler et 
a\, 1991 ). It is suggested that the theoretical justilication provided by Cutler et al (1991) is 
somewhat erroneous. 
Despite the initial feasibility of this theoreticaljustitication, the elaboration 
likelihood model of persuasion ( 1986) fhils to provide an adequate explanation for the effect 
ofadversarial sources of information. If the credibility of the adversarial expert is considered 
questionable when compared to the non-adversmial expert, it appears feasible to assume that 
the credibility of the prosecution counsel would be considered questionable when compared 
to the advcrsarial expert. ln this manner, subject.:; would demonstrate the tendency to 
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critically evaluate the contents of information delivered by the prosecution counsel, whilst 
unconditionally accepting the information delivered by the adversarial expert witness. In this 
manner, the provision ofadversarial fonns of expert testimony actually facilitate a scepticism 
effect. As ratings of credibility assigned to the prosecution counsel were excluded from 
consideration, it is not possible to substantiate this issue. However, this scenario serves to 
emphasise the circularity of conclusions that are justified in terms of the elaboration 
likelihood model of persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
When summarising the research examining the effect of expert testimony for 
the defence, it is possible to draw a relatively simple conclusion. Although jurors are 
completely ignorant as to the influence of estimator and system variables on positive 
identifications of the accused, the provision of expert testimony for the defence serves to 
provide the crucial information from which informed decisions may be made (Cutler eta\, 
1989). By communicating in!~lrmation in a manner that encourages critical evaluation, jury 
members have the basis to draw appropriate inferences from the evidence about witnessing 
a11d idcntitication conditions (Cutler et a!, 1989). Where judgments in relation to the 
accuracy of the identification, and the verdict delivered arc based upon the critical evaluation 
of evidence, the reliability of that judgement should substantially increase (Wells, 1986). 
Such outcomes clearly serve to reduce the probability of wrongfully convicting an innocent 
victim of misidentilicat:on Where judgements are based on the critical evaluation of 
information, the probability ofwronglldly acquitting an otherwise guilty individual should 
be substantially protected. In light of such findings, the American courts have acknowledged 
the po1cntial bcncllts to be obtained from admitting expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification issues (Lollus, \986). As this provision ensures the protection of the 
community at large, and the civil liberties of those accused on the basis of eyewitness 
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testimony, research witP:n this domain virtually ceased at the beginning of the I9901s. 
However, the position of the courts within Australia paints a somewhat different 
interpretation in terms of the potential benefits to be obtained from admitting expert 
testimony for the defence. 
The Australian Courts and Expert Testimony for the Defence 
The Australian judiciary perceives the expert testimony of the psychologist 
(in relation to eyewitness identification issues) to fall within the parameters of common 
knowledge (Law Reform Commission, 1985). It has been determined that as the "ordinary 
man on the jury is competent to understand ordinary things, he is competent to comprehend 
the psychic tlmctioning of the ordinary man .... they have on this basis excluded expert 
testimony that relates to him" (Law Reform Commission, \985, p411 ). This attitude has 
been succinctly reinforced by judicial authorities in the appeal of R. v. Fang (1980), and the 
case ofR. v. Smith (1987) (Queensland Law Reports, 1980; and Victorian Law Reports, 
1987). As demonstrated within the context of this revie\v, a vast proportion of the 
psychological literature serves to negate the validity of such argumentation. Jury members 
consistently demonstrate a level of insensitivity to the mechanisms responsible for both the 
fallibility and the malleability of the human memory (Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981; 
Yarmey & Tressillian-Joncs, 1983; Cutler, Penrod, & Stuve, 1988; and Cutler, Dexter, & 
Penrod, 1991 ). In conjunction with this element, the provision of expert testimony for the 
defence has been demonstrated to "assist the tder of fa•t in understanding the evidence, and 
determining a fact in issue" (Law Reform Commission, 1985, p3). When considering the 
potential benefits to be obtained from admitting expert testimony for the cietfmce (in relation 
to eyewitness identification issues), a reform of judicial attitudes in relation to the 
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admissibility of such testimony is warranted. 
Despite the appeal of this assertion, the psychological literature has yet to 
extensively analyse the procedural consequences of admitting expert testimony for the 
defence. When considering the vety nature of psychological research, one such consequence 
appears self evident in nature. In essence, psychological research demonstrating the adverse 
nature of estimator and system variables has not been consistent. These contradictory 
findings pose a problem in terms of admitting expert testimony for the defence. If the "hired 
gun" theory advocated by Brekke et al ( 1991) proves accurate, the admissibility of expert 
testimony for the detencc in relation to eyewitness identification issues may facilitate a 
situation of trial by expert (as opposed to trial by jmy). This potential is justified when 
considering the following scenario. During the process of trial, the prosecution counsel 
assumes the burden of proving (beyond a reasonable doubt) that the accused is actually the 
perpetrator of the crime (Gillies, 1987). Where the central evidence is the positive 
identification of the accused by the victim of the crime, an extensive examination of the 
reliability of that identification is warranted. If witnessing and identification conditions are 
conducive to a false identification, it is likely that the prosecution counsel will employ the 
services of a psychologist who specialises in eyewitness identification issues. As the 
prosecution counsel is motivated by the desire to establish the reliability of that 
identification, the psychologist would be required to deliver testimony that emphasises the 
positive impact of estimator and systt.!rn variables on the eyewitness identification. For 
example, it may be argued that the presence of a weapon, or extreme levels of stress, serve 
to enhance the perceptual abilities of the eyewitness (Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). As the 
defence counsel is motivated by the desire to demonstrate the erroneous nature of the 
identification. the sc!viccs of a psychologist who emphasises the adverse effect of estimator 
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and system variables will be employed. For example, it may be argued that the presence of 
a weapon, or extreme levels of stress, serve to hinder the perceptual acuity of the eyewitness 
(Christianson & Loftus, 1987). If witnessing and identitlcation conditions actually implied 
a false identitk.ation (as demonstrated by a significant proportion of the psychological 
literature in relation to estimator and system variables)- what effects would be yielded as 
a function of the provision of competing modes of expert testimony? Would jurors still 
demonstrate a sensitisation effect in relation to the provision of expert testimony for the 
defence? Would a juror confusion eifect be yielded? Or would jurors demonstrate scepticism 
in relation to the validity of psychological research in general? 
Although the psychological literature may argue the beneficial nature of 
expert testimony for the defence (in relation to eyewitness identification issues), it has yet 
to explore the impact of expert testimony for the prosecution, and the notion of competing 
expert opinions within the same criminal trial. If psychological knowledge is to be 
adequately applied within the legal context, the differential effects of each mode of 
testimony require extensive examination. It is this notion that has provided the conceptual 
foundations for the present form of research. 
Experimental Design 
This research was generated to explore the differential effects of alternative 
types of expert testimony in eyewitness identification cases. So as to enable a thorough 
exploration of the decision making processes of the individual juror, several research 
questions \vcrc developed for analysis. When witnessing and identification conditions are 
conducive to a H1lse identilication; 
• does expert testimony for the defence and the prosecution within the same criminal 
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trial influence the decision of the individual juror? 
• does expert testimony for the prosecution influence the decision of the individual 
juror? 
• does expert testimony for the defence influence the decision of the individual juror? 
The decision making process of the juror was divided into three stages - that 
of juror inference, juror evaluation, and juror judgement. Juror inference is defined as the 
ability to draw appropriate inferences from information in relation to witnessing and 
identification conditions. This required the analysis of credibility ratings afforded to the 
eyewitness and the accused. Although past research has restricted analysis to eyewitness 
credibility, any sensitisation efTect should also manifest in differential ratings of credibility 
assigned to the accused. In conjunction with the notion of credibility, individual ratings as 
to the strens,rth of the case for both the prosecution and the defence were incorporated. The 
second stage of the decision making process is defined as the ability to c,riticaily evaluate 
information about witnessing and identification conditions. As Cutler et a\ ( 1991) 
considered critical evaluation to be a fUnction of suspect expert credibility, individual ratings 
of credibility afforded to each expert witness were incorporated. As the defence and the 
prosecution counsel constitute an additional source of information in relation to witnessing 
and identification conditions, ratings of credibility afforded to each were required. The final 
stage in the decision making process is defined as the ability to formulate accurate 
judgements in relation to the accuracy of the identification, and th verdict delivered. As 
qualitative responses provide a rich source of information in relation to the determinants of 
guilt or innocence, live elements that influenced decisions in relation to verdict delivered 
were incorporated. It was anticipated that each category of dependent variables would 
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enable a thorough examinatiOn of the differential effects of alternative forms of expert 
testimony in eyewitness identification cases. 
A 2 x 2 exper.mental design enabled the analysis of expert testimony for the 
prosecution and expert testimony for the defence. Table 1 below identifies each experimental 
condition. 
Table I 
Experimental Conditions 
Defence Prosecution Expert 
Expert Present Absent 
Present I 2 
Absent 3 4 
As shown in Table I, in condition one, the prosecution counsel implied that the eyewitness 
identification wos reliable when questioning the eyewitness. An cxpe11 witness gave 
testimony corroborating the scenario presented by the prosecution counsel. Within this same 
experimental condition, the defence counsel implied that the eyewitness identification was 
Jacking in reliability when conducting the cross-examination of the eyewitness. An expert 
witness delivered testimony corroborating the scenario presented by the defence counsel. 
ln condition two, the dcf'cncc counsel emphasised the lack of identification reliability when 
conducting the cross-examination of the eyewitness. An expert witness delivered testimony 
reinforcing this notion or unreliability. In condition three, the prosecution counsel 
emphasised the reliable nature of the identification when questioning the eyewitness. This 
opinion was rcinl'orccd by an expert witness who corroborated the opinion of the 
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prosecution counsel. Finally, in condition four, no expert witnesses were introduced -the 
prosecution counsel emphasised identification reliability when questioning the eyewitness, 
whilst the defence counsel emphasised the lack of identification reliabili~y when conducting 
the cross examination of the eyewitness. In this manner, the provision of expert testimony 
became the scientific reinforcement of information delivered by both the defence counsel, 
and the prosecution counsel. The estimator and system variables cited as alluding to 
identification reliability, or a Jack of reliability, were equivalent within each experimental 
condition (the types of variables mentioned shall be explored within the later sections of this 
thesis). It \vas anticipated that each cxrerimental condition would enable a thorough 
exploration oft he di!Tercntial ctl'ccts of alternative types of expert testimony in eyewitness 
identilication cases. 
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CHAPTER TWO- METHOD AND RESULTS 
Participants 
Participants constituted a sample of eligible jury members within the general 
population. A snowball sampling procedure saw volunteers within three large companies, 
and a university, distribute experimental materials to co~ workers, friends, and acquaintances. 
Although the external validity of non-probability sampling procedures is open to criticism, 
the confines of exploratory research rendered this approach feasible. An analysis of 
demographic data (such as employment status and age) enabled the determination of 
representativeness in relation to eligibility for jury duty. One hundred and four subjects 
participated (26 participants per experimental condition). The mean age was 39.64, whilst 
employment status ranged from the skilled trades, to banking and finance, general office 
duties, self-proprietors, home caretakers, and the unemployed sector. 
Materials 
The primary experimental material was a trial transcript depicting the armed 
hold-up ora service station (an adaptation of a scenario presented by Loftus, 1980). The 
critical evidence constituted the positive identification of the accused by the victim of the 
crime. The case presented by both the prosecution and the defence assumed the following 
form -
ProsCl'ution Case 
• The victim positively identified the accused as the offender. 
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• The accused was unable to provide an alibi for the day in question. Having moved 
house on the previous day, the accused claimed he was recuper?.ting at home. There 
W(;cre no witnesses to corroborate this potential alibi. 
• A gun \';as retrieved from the scene of the crime. Police investigations determined 
that the weapon was registered to a friend of the accused -this friend had reported 
the weapon as stolen two days prior to the hold-up. 
• The police officer in charge oft he investigation confirmed that the victim positively 
identified the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. 
Defence Cnse 
• The accused protested his innocence claiming that the eyewitness was mistaken. 
• The next door neighbour oft he accused remembered hearing music in the flat next 
door at the time of the robbery. However, he was unable to corroborate the alibi of 
the accused with conlidcnce. 
• The police ollicer in charge of the investigation stated that at no time did the 
accused admit to being the perpetrator of the crime. 
Poor witnessing and identification conditions were held constant across all 
experimental conditions The defence counsel emphasised the lack of identitication reliability 
(when cross-examining the eyc\vitncss), whilst the prosecution counsel described the 
identification as reliable (when questioning the eyewitness). When an expert witness testified 
fiJr the defence, the scenario presented by the defence counsel was reinfOrced- the expert 
witness submitted L'mpirical evidence demonstrating the adverse en:ect of estimator and 
system variables on eyewitness idcntilications. When an expert witness testified for the 
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prosecution, the scenario presented by the prosecution counsel was reinforced - the expert 
witness testified that estimator and system variables were optimal for the identification of 
the perpetrator. The following estimator and system variables were varied orthogonally 
across each experimental condition :-
• Weapon Focus- the victim alluded to spending more time focusing on the weapon 
as opposed to the facial features of the perpetrator. 
• Stress - the victim ailuded to being anxious prior to the hold-up, and during. 
• Suggestive Identification Parade - the accused was identified via a show-up, as 
opposed to an identification parade. 
• Unconscious Tnmsfe1·ence- the accused moved into the same block of flats as the 
victim the day before the hold-up. 
• Exposure Time - the hold-up transpired within a tive minute duration. 
Within the expert testimony conditions, each expert was subjected to a cross-
examination. Those elements recommended by Cutler et a! ( 1989) were emphasised in the 
following manner:-
• Psychologists do not onen agree in relation to the reliability of research tindings. 
• The majority of psychological analyses are conducted on student samples as opposed 
to the general population Such procedures call into question the generaliseability 
of rc~carch !indings. 
• It is not possible to measure the level of stress experienced by the victim of the 
en me. 
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• The psychologist is a paid witness for the defence (or the prosecution where 
applicable), and has only offered expert testimony for the defence (as opposed to the 
prosecution where applicable). 
Four versions of the trial transcript were prepared, and delivered in a condition appropriate 
manner (see Appendix A, B, C, and D for relevant transcripts). Although it could be argued 
that a video enactment of the above transcripts would optimise external validity, this 
procedure was considered to be inappropriate in terms oft he present analysis. As physical 
characteristics of the accused, characteristics of the eyewitness, ethnicity, and mode of 
speech. have all been demonstrated to influence the outcome of a criminal trial, it was 
considered necessary to experimentally control for these extra-legal sources of juror bias 
(Gerbasi, Zuckerman, & Reis, 1977). 
A standardised instruction sheet to appear at the beginning of each trial 
transcript was developed. This advised subjects of the nature of the experimental task- they 
were required to imagine themselves as real jurors, read the transcript once, and complete 
the questions appearing at the conclusion of the transcript (see Appendix E for sheet 
fOrmat). In addition, a qucstionaire was developed to appear at the conclusion of each trial 
transcript. The dependent variables that enabled the assessment of each stage within the 
decision making process, and relevant scales of measurement are listed below:-
.Juror lnfel'cnccs 
• Credibility ratings of the eye\vitness and the accused were scored on a five point 
like11 scale This continuous scale ranged from minus two (definitely not credible), 
minus one (not credible), zero (undecided), one (credible), to two {definitely 
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credible). 
• Ratings as to the strent,rth of the case for both the prosecution and the defence were 
scored on a five point Iikert scale. This continuous scale ranged from zero (very 
weak), one (weak), two (moderate), three (strong), to four (very strong). 
Juror Evaluation 
• Credibility ratings of the defence counsel, the prosecution counsel, and the expert 
witness where applicable, were scored on a five point Iikert sr::ale. This continuous 
scale ranged from minus two (definitely not credible), minus one (not credible), zero 
(undecided), ooe (credible), to two (definitely credible). 
Juror Judgement 
• Verdict delivered was scored as guilty as opposed to not guilty. The dichotomous 
nature of this variable required the collation of frequency counts in terms of verdict 
type (guilty -v- not guilty). 
• Subjects were asked to list five factors that influenced their decision in relation to 
verdict delivered. Subjects \Vere provided with one line of writing space per factor. 
• The likelihood of identification accuracy was scored on a five point Iikert scale. This 
continuous scale ranged fTom minus two (highly unlikely), minus one (unlikely), zero 
(undecided), one (likely), to two (highly likely). 
Despite the controversy surrounding subjects interpretations of the term undecided. the 
inclusion of this clement within the majority of Iikert scales was required. As the standard 
of proof in a criminal trial is beyond reasonable doubt, any subject who is undecided should 
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render a not guilty verdict (Appendix F details questionaire format and relevant scales of 
measurement). 
ln accordance with the Edith Cowan University guidelines, an infonned 
consent sheet was also prepared (see Appendix G for consent format). This form 
summarised the nature cfthe research, emphasised the right to withdraw participation at any 
stage during proceedings, and offered telephone contact for both the ethical and educational 
functions of the debriefing process. 
Procedure 
Condition appropriate court transcripts were randomly organised. Three 
major companies were approached within the district of Belmont (Western Australia). On 
discussing the nature of the research, company directors allowed the researcher to approach 
staff, and request participation on a voluntary basis. The anonymity of each company was 
both requested and assured. Students at the Edith Cowan University were also approached 
(these individuals did not participate in the present fonn of research). On obtaining informed 
consent, forty individuals agreed to participate. Each participant distributed a number of 
experimental materials to co-workers, friends, and acquaintances. One hundred and fifty 
transc1ipts were distributed in total, with a response rate of 69% over a six week period of 
distribution. In order to ensure the receipt of appropriate debriefing, telephone contact was 
encouraged - results are to be distributed to those whom have requested the same. 
Results 
This research examined the ditferential efl'ects of alternative types of expert 
testimony on the decision of the individual juror. The decision making process was divided 
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into three stages - that of juror inference, juror evaluation, and juror judgement. As a 
consequence, results shall be categorised in terms of each stage within the decision making 
process. 
Juror Inference 
Each dependent variable within this stage of the decision making process was 
analysed with a 2 x 2 ANOV A {prosecution expert x defence expert). All assumptions of 
the ANOVA were adhered to, excluding that of normality. As the ANOVA is considered 
robust to the violation of this assumption (where cell sizes are equal, and greater than N = 
20), this was not considered to be problematic in terms of further statistical analyses (Hills, 
1994). 
When analysing individual ratings of eyewitness credibility, the 2 x 2 
ANOVA demonstrated a non-significant interaction, E (1, 97) = 0.01, p > 0.05, in 
conjunction with non-significant main effects : Defence, E (1, 97) == 2.49, 12 > O.OS, 
prosecution, E {I, 97) = 0.21, p > 0.05. Table 2 below provides a summary of descriptive 
statistics in relation to ratings of eyewitness credibility. 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics- Credibility of the Eyewitness 
Prosecution Expert 
Present Absent Total 
Defence M ,ill M ,ill M 
Present 0.34 102 0.46 0.94 0.40 
Absent 0 03 Ill 0.11 107 0.07 
Total 118 0.28 0.23 
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As shown in Table 2, mean ratings of eyewitness credibility were equivalent across groups. 
Where expert testimony for the defence and the prosecution was present, a range of four 
was observed (one extreme score of -2 was eliminated from consideration). Where expert 
testimony for the defence was presented in isolation, a range of three was observed. Where 
expert testimony for the prosecution was presented in isolation, a range of four was 
observed. Finally, where ex]JCrt testimony was excluded from proceedings, a range of four 
was observed. Each figure reflects a distribution of scores ranging from a view of the 
eyewitness as not credible (-2) to a view of the eyewitness as credible (2), with a median 
point of zero reflecting an inability to decide. Table 3 below provides descriptive statistics 
that identify the proportion of decisions that were observed within each range. 
Table 3 
Distribution of Scores- Eyewitness Cre<iibility 
Expert Type Not Credible Undecided Credible 
Prosecution & Defence 17.39% 26.09% 52.17% 
Detence 19.24% 26.92% 53.84% 
Prosecution 30.77% 38.46% 30.77% 
Control 34.62% 23.08% 42.30% 
When analysing ratings of credibility assigned to the accused, a 2 x 2 
ANOVA demonstrated a non-significant interaction, E (I, 97) = 0.08, p > 0.05, and non-
signiticant main c!lCcts: Defence, E (1, 97) = 0.03, 12 > 0.05, prosecution, E (1, 97) = 0.03, 
11 > 0 OS Table 4 below provides a summary of descriptive statistics in relation to the 
credibility of lhc accus-ed. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics - Accused Credibility 
Prosecution Expert 
Present Absent Total 
Defence M Sl2 M sn M 
Present 045 0.88 0.53 0.81 0.50 
Absent 0.53 0.98 0.52 0.91 0 52 
Total 0.50 0.52 0.51 
As shown in Table 4, mean ratings of accused credibility were equivalent across groups. 
Where expert testimony for the defence and the prosecution was present, a range of three 
was observed (one extreme score of -2 was eliminated tl·om consideration). Where expert 
testimony for the defence was present, a range of three was observed. Where expeti 
testimony for the prosecution was present, a range of four was observed (one extreme score 
of -2 was eliminated from consideration). Finally, where expert testimony was excluded 
from proceedings, a range of four was observed (one extreme score of -2 was eliminated 
from consideration). Each figure reflects a distribution of scores ranging fl·om a view of the 
accused as not credible ( -2) to a view of the accused as credible (2), with a median point of 
zero reflecting an inability to decide. Table 5 below provides descriptive statistics that 
identifY the proportion of decisions that were observed within each range. 
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Table 5 
Distribution of Scores - Accused Credibilit:,: 
Expert Type Not Credible Undecided Credible 
Prosecution & Defence 12.50% 16.67% 66.67% 
Defence 1538% 19.23% 65.39% 
Prosecution I 1.53% 23.08% 61.54% 
Control 8.00% 28.00% 60.00% 
When analysing ratings of the strength of the prosecution case, a 2 x 2 
AN OVA demonstrated a non-significant interaction, F (I, 98) = 0.15, u > 0.05, and non-
significant main eflects : Delence : .E (I, 98) = 0. 15, l2 > 0. 05, prosecution, E (I, 98) = 0.12, 
12 > 0.05. Table 6 below provides a summary of descriptive statistics in relation to the 
strength of the case for the prosecution. 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statis.ti~- Strength of the Prosecutio_n Case 
Prosecution Expert 
Present Absent Total 
Dcknce M su M SQ M 
Present 2 OS 1.05 2.07 1.09 2.08 
-
Absent 1.92 1.09 2 07 0.97 2.00 
Total 2.00 2.08 2 04 
As shown in Table 6, mean ratings of the strength of the prosecution case were equivalent 
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across groups. Where expert testimony for the defence and the prosecution was present, a 
range of three was observed. Where expert testimony tOr the defence was present, a range 
of four was observed. Where expert testimony for the prosecution was present, a range of 
three was observed (three extreme scores of 4 were eliminated from consideration). Finally, 
where expert testimony was excluded fium proceedings, a range of four was observed. This 
reflects a distribution of scores ranging from a view of the prosecution case as weak (0) to 
a view of the prosecution case as strong (4), with a median point of two reflecting moderate 
strength. Table 7 below provides descriptive statistics that identify the proportion of 
decisions that were observed within each range. 
Table 7 
Distribution of Scores- Strength of the Prosecution Case 
Expert Type Weak Moderate Strong 
Prosecution & Defence 37.50% 29.!7% 33.33% 
Defence 38.46% 19.23% 42.3\% 
Prosecution 46.15% 30.77% 7.69% 
Control 26.92% 42.31% 30.77% 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA on ratings of the strength of the defence case demonstrated 
a non-significant interaction, and a non-significant main eflbct fOr the prosecution. The main 
eflCct fOr the defence was significant, E (I, 98) = 3 97, p < 0.05. Table 8 below provides a 
summary or descriptive statistics in relation to the strength of the case tbr the defence. 
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Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics- Strength of the Defence Case 
Prosecution Expert 
Present Absent Total 
Defence M SD M SD M 
Present 2.45 0.77 2.19 0.84 2.32 
Absent 2.03 0.66 2.00 0.80 2.01 
Total 2.24 2.09 2.16 
As shown in Table 8, the case for the defence was perceived as stronger where expert 
testimony for the defence was present. Where expert testimony for the defence and the 
prosecution was present, a range of three was observed. Where expert testimony for the 
defence was present, a range of three was observed. Where expe11 tt.;stimony for the 
prosecution was present, a range of three was observed (five extreme scores of3, and three 
extreme scores of 0 and 1 were eliminated from consideration). Finally, where expert 
testimony was excluded fl·om proceedings, a range of three was observed (one extreme 
score of 4 was eliminated f-l·om consideration). This reflects a distribution of scores ranging 
from a view oft he defence case as weak (0) to a view of the defence case as strong ( 4), with 
a median point of two reflecting moderate strength. Table 9 below provides descriptive 
statistics that identifY the proportion or decisions that were observed within each range. 
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Table 9 
Distribution of Scores- Strength of the Defence Case 
Expert Type Weak Moderate Strong 
Prosecution & Defence 8.33% 45.83% 45.84% 
Defence 19.23% 50.00% 30.77% 
Prosecution 0.00% 69.23% 0.00% 
Control 26.92% 50.00% 19.23% 
Juror Evaluation 
The orthogonal analysis of ratings of expert credibility required the use of 
multiplet-tests- BontCroni adjusted alpha levels will be reported. All assumptions of the t-
test were adhered to, excluding that of normality. In light of the sample size, this was not 
considered to be problematic. Conditions in receipt of expert testimony were analysed in the 
following manner:-
I. An independent samples t-tcst was conducted on ratings of credibility 
assigned to the prosecution expert and the defence expert (when appearing alone). Results 
demonstrated that mean diHCrcnccs in mtings of credibility assigned to each expert witness 
were non-signiticant, 1 (50)= -1.09, n > 0.02. Table 10 below provides a summary of 
descriptive statistics in relation to expert credibility. 
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Table I 0 
Descriptive Statistics - Prosecution Expert (Alone) x Defence Expert (A~ 
Group M S!2 
Detence (Alone) -0.15 1.08 
Prosecution (Alone) 0.19 1.20 
As shown in Table 10, mean ratings of expert credibility were equivalent for both groups. 
Where expert testimony tOr the defence was presented in isolation, a range of four was 
observed. Where expert testimony for the prosecution was presented in isolation, a range 
offour was also observed. This reflects as distribution of scores ranging from a view of the 
expert as not credible (-2), to a view oft he expert as credible (2), with a median point of 
zero rellecting an inability to decide. Table II below provides descriptive statistics that 
identifY the proportion of decisions that were observed within each range. 
Table II 
Distribution of Scores - Prosecution Expert (Alone) x Defence Expert (Alone) 
Expert Type Not Credible Undecided rredible 
Defence (Alone) 42.30% 30.77% 26.93% 
Prosecution (Alone) 30.77% 26.93% 42.30% 
2 An independent samples t-tcst was conducted on ratings of credibility 
a~,signcd to the prosecution expert (when appearing alone x when appearing in co1~unction 
with an expert witness for the defence). The mean differences in ratings of credibility were 
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non-significant, t ( 48) -0.41, p > 0.02. Table 12 below provides a summary of descriptive 
statistics in relation to expert credibility. 
Table 12 
Descriptive Statistics - Prosecution Expert (Alone) x Prosecution (with Defence) 
Group M SJ2 
Prosecution (Alone) 0.19 1.20 
Prosecution (&Defence) 0.33 1.20 
As shown in Table 12, mean ratings of credibility assigned to the prosecution expert were 
equivalent for both groups. Where expert testimony for the prosecution was presented in 
isolation, a range of tbur was observed Where expert testimony for the prosecution was 
presented in conjunction with expert testimony for the defence, a range of four was also 
observed. These retlect a distribution of scores ranging from a view of the expert as not 
credible (-2), to a view of the expert as credible (2), with a median point of zero reflecting 
an inability to decide. Table 13 below provides descriptive statistics that identifY the 
proportion of decisions that were observed within each range. 
Table 13 
Distr.ib_IJ1imLQ[_Scores - Pro_sgcution Expert (Alone) x Prosecution Expert (& Defence) 
Expert Type Not Credible Undecided Credible 
Prosecutio11 (Alone) 30.77% 26.93% 42.30% 
Prosecution (&Del) 26.92% 11.53% 53.85% 
Expert Testimony 41 
3. An independent samples t-test was conducted on ratings of credibility 
assigned to the defence expe1t (when appearing alone x when appearing in conjunction with 
a prosecution expert witness). The mean differences in ratings of credibility assigned to the 
defence expert were significant, t (48) = -2.72, 12 < 0.02. Table 14 below provides a 
summary of descriptive statistics in relation to defence expert credibility. 
Table 14 
Descriptive Statistics- Defence Expert (Alone) x Defence Expert (with Prosecution) 
Group M .5]2 
Defence (Alone) -0.15 1.08 
Defence (&Prosecution) 0.62 0.92 
As shown in Table 14, the expert witness for the defence was perceived as more credible 
when appearing in conjunction w·ith an expert witness for the prosecution. Where expert 
testimony for the dctbncc was presented in isolation, a range of fbur was observed Where 
expert testimony tbr the c\etCnce was presented in conjunction with expert testimony for the 
prosecution, a range of four \vas also obsc1vcd (one extreme score of I \vas eliminated ti·om 
consideration) These ret1cct a distribution of scores ranging from a view of the expert as 
Pet credible ( -2), to a view of the expert as credible (2), with a median point of zero 
rellecting an inability to decide. Table 15 below prov·;dcs descriptive statistics that identify 
the proportion of decisions that were observed within each range. 
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Table 15 
Distribution of Scores - Defence Expert (Alone) x Defence Expert (&Prosecution) 
Expert Type Not Credible Undecided Credible 
Defence (Alone) 42.30% 30.77% 26.93% 
Defence ( & Pro sec) 8.33% 16.67% 70.83% 
4. A dependent samples Hest was conducted on ratings of credibility assigned 
to the prosecution expert and the defence expert (when appearing within the same 
experimental condition). Results demonstrated that mean ditTerences in ratings of credibility 
assigned to each expert witness were non-significant, t (25) = 1.23, 12 > 0.02. Table 16 
below provides a summary of descriptive statistics in relation to within group expert 
credibility. 
Table 16 
Descriptive Statistics- Within Groups Ratings ofExpe1t Credibility (Defence x Prosecution) 
Expert Type M SD 
Prosecution 0.33 1.20 
Defence 0.62 0.92 
As shown in Table 16, mean ratings of expert credibility were equivalent for both groups. 
Where expert testimony for the prosecution was presented, a range of four was observed. 
Where expert tc:•timnny for 1hc defence was presented, a range of four was also observed 
(an extreme score of -2 was eliminated from consideration). This reflects a distribution of 
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scores ranging from a view of the expert as not credible ( -2), to a view of the expert as 
credible (2), with a median point of zero reflecting an inability to decide. Table 17 below 
provides descriptive statistics that identifY the proportion of decisions that were observed 
within each range. 
Table 17 
Distribution of Scores - Within Group Expert Credibility 
Expert Type Not Credible Undecided Credible 
Defence 8.33% 16.67% 70.83% 
Prosecution 26.92% 11.53% 53.85% 
When an~ h:,ing ratings of credibility assigned to the defence counsel, a 2 x: 
2 ANOVA demonstrated a uuJl-:-lgniticant interaction, E (I, 98) = 0.52, p > 0.05, and non-
significant main eflects : Defence. f( I, 98) ~ 0.08, 11 > 0.05, prosecution, E( 1, 98) ~ 0.00, 
p_ > 0.05. Table 18 below provides a summary of descriptive statistics in relation to the 
credibility of the defence counsel. 
Table 18 
Descriptive Statistics- Credibility of the Defence Counsel 
Prosecution Expert 
Present Absent Total 
De knee M S12 M S12 M 
Present (] 75 0.79 0.61 0.94 0.68 
Absent 0 57 0.75 0.69 0.97 0.63 
Total 0.66 0.65 0.65 
Expert Testimony 44 
As shown in table 18, mean ratings of defence counsel credibility were equivalent for all 
groups. A range of three was observed where expert testimony for the defence and 
prosecution was presented, and where expert testimony for the defence was presented in 
isolation. Where expert testimony for the prosecution appeared, a range of two was 
observed. Finally, where expert testimony was excluded, a range of four was observed (six 
extreme scores of -2, M 1, and 0, and three extreme scores of 2 were excluded from 
consideration). Each figure reflects a distribution of scores ranging from a view of the 
defence counsel as not credible (-2), to a view of the defence counsel as credible (2), with 
a median point of zero retlecting an inability to decide. Table 19 below provides descriptive 
statistics that identifY the proportion of decisions that were observed within each range. 
Table 19 
Distribution of Scores M Credibility of the Defence Counsel 
Expert Type Not Credible Undecided Credible 
Prosecution & Defence 8.34% 20.83% 70.83% 
Defence 19.23% 11.54% 69.23% 
Prosecution 15.38% II. 54% 73.08% 
Control 0.00% 0.00% 65.38% 
When analysing ratings of credibility afl'orded to the prosecution counsel, a 
2 x 2 AN OVA demonstrated a non-signi11cant interaction, E {1,98) = 0.07, p_ > 0.05, and 
non-signilicant main ctl'ccts: Defence, E (1, 98) = 3.15, p > 0.05, prosecution, E {I, 98) = 
2 78, p - · 0 ()) Table 20 below provides a summary of descriptive statistics in relation to 
the credibility oft he prosecution counsel. 
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Table 20 
Descriptive Statistics- Credibility ,1fthe Prosecution Counsel 
Prosecution Expert 
Present Absent Total 
Defence M S!2 M S!2 M 
Present 0.75 0.94 1.00 0.69 0.88 
Absent 0.38 1.06 0.73 0.97 0.55 
Total 0.57 0.86 0.71 
As shown in Table 20, mean ratings of credibility assigned to the prosecution counsel were 
equivalent across groups. Where expert testimony for the defence and the prosecution 
appeared, a range of four was observed (one extreme score of -2 was excluded from 
consideration)_ \Vherc expert testimony for the defence was presented, a range of three was 
observed (two extreme scores of -I. and four extreme scores of 2 were excluded from 
consideration). \Vhcre expc11 testimony for the prosecution appeared, a range orfour was 
observed. Finally, where cxpcn testimony was excluded, a range of three was observed (six 
extreme ~cores or -1 and 0, and three extreme scores or 2 were excluded tl·om the 
consideration). Each figure renects as distribution of scores ranging from a view of the 
expert ns not credible (-2). to a view of the expert as credible (2), with a median point of 
zero rcllecting an inability to decide. Table 21 below provides descriptive statistics that 
identify the proportion of decisions that were observed within each range. 
Expert Testimony 46 
Table 21 
Distribution of Scores- Credibility of the Prosecution Counsel 
Expert Type Not Credible Undecided Credible 
Prosecution & Defence 4.17% 20.83% 70.83% 
Defence 0.00% 0.00% 76.92% 
Prosecution 26.92% 11.54% 61.54% 
. 
Control 0.00% 0.00% 65.38% 
Juror Judgement 
When analysing ratings as to the probability that the identification was 
correct, n2 x 2 AN OVA demonstrated a non-significant interaction, E (1, 98) = 0.35, p > 
0.05, and non-significant main effects: Defence, E (1, 98) = 0.35, 12 > 0.05, prosecution, E 
(1, 98) = 0.01, P- > 0.05. Table 22 below provid~" a summary of descriptive statistics in 
relation to the likelihood that the identit1cation was correct. 
Table 22 
Descriptive Statistics- Likelihood of Identification Accumcy 
Prosecution Expert 
Present Absent Total 
-
-
Defence M SD M SD M 
Present -0.12 1.29 0.03 1.21 -0.04 
Absent 0.03 I. II -0.07 1.16 -0 01 
-
Total -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 
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As shown in Table 22, mean ratings of identification accuracy were equivalent across 
groups. A range of four was observed when expert testimony for the defence and 
prosecution appeared, when expert testimony for the defence appeared, when expe1t 
testimony for the prosecution appeared, and where expert testimony was excluded from 
experimental conditions. This reflects as distribution of scores ranging from a view oft he 
identification as lacking in reliability ( ·2), to a view of the identification as reliable (2), with 
a median point of zero reflecting an inability to decide. Table 23 below provides descriptive 
statistics that identify the proportion of decisions that were observed within each range. 
Table 23 
Distribution of Scores· 1.-ikelihood of Identification Accuracy 
Expert Type Not Reliable Undecided Reliable 
Prosecution & Defence 45.83% 25.00% 29.17% 
Defence 46.16% 15.38% 38.46% 
Prosecution 38.46% 26.92% 34.62% 
Control 46.16% 26.92% 26.92% 
A two· way chi·squarc analysis was conducted on the proportion of not guilty 
verdicts_ :\11 <~ssumptions of the chi·square \vcre adhered to. Results demonstrated non-
significancL', x-' (I,-~-=, 80) =~ O.O:'i, 12 > 0.05. Table 24 below summarises the frequency 
count of nut guilty verdicts in accordance with the type of expert testimony delivered. 
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Table 24 
Expert Testimony and the Frequency of Not Guilty Verdicts 
Defence Prosecution 
Present Absent Total 
Present 23 (51.10%) 22 (48.90%) 45 (56.30%) 
Absent 17 (48.60%) 18 (51.40%) 35 (43.80%) 
As shown in Table 24, the proportion of not guilty verdicts across each form of expert 
testimony were equivalent. 
An analysis of within group proportions of guilty as opposed to not guilty 
verdicts enabled the further exploration of the final decision rendered by individual jurors. 
A one-way chi-square analysis of those in receipt of expert testimony for the prosecution 
was significant, x2 (I, N = 26) = 9.85, .(2 < 0.05. Table 25 below provides a summary of 
within group proportions of guilty as opposed to not guilty verdicts. 
Table 25 
Verdict Type as a Function of Expert Testimony for the Prosecution 
Verdict ]'j % 
Guilty 5 19.20 
Not Guilty 21 80.80 
Total 26 100.00 
A.: <ihown in table 25, subjects in receipt of expert testimony for the prosecution delivered 
a sigm:"icantly greater proportion of not guilty verdicts. 
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A one way chi-square analysis of those in receipt of expert testimony for the 
defence was non-significant, x2 {1, N = 26) = 2.46, p > 0.05. Table 26 below provides a 
summary of the within group proportion of guilty a:; opposed to not guilty verdicts. 
Table 26 
Verdict Type as a Function of Expert Testimony for the Defence 
Verdict N % 
Guilty 9 34.62 
Not Guilty 17 65.38 
Total 26 100.00 
As shown in Table 26, the within group proportion of guilty and not guilty verdicts was 
equivalent. 
A one-way chi-square analysis of those in receipt of competing modes of 
expert testimony was significant, x2 {1, N = 26) = 3.84, p < 0.05. Table 27 provides a 
summary of the within group proportion of guilty and not guilty verdicts. 
Table 27 
Type of Verdict a~ a Function of Competing ExP-ert Opinions 
Verdict ]'! % 
Guilty 8 30.77 
Not Guilty 18 69.23 
Total 26 100.00 
As shown in Table 27, subjects in receipt of competing :modes of expert opinion within the 
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same experimental condition delivered a significantly greater proportion of not guilty 
verdicts. 
A one-way chi-square analysis of the control condition was significant, X2 
(1, ]'j ~ 26) ~ 5.53, p < 0.05. Table 28 below provides a summary of the within group 
proportions of guilty as opposed to not guilty verdicts. 
Table 28 
Differential Proportions of Verdict Type Within the Control Condition 
Verdict ]'j % 
Guilty 7 26.92 
Not Guilty 19 73.08 
Total 26 100.00 
As shown in Table 28, subjects not in receipt of expert testimony delivered a significantly 
greater proportion of not guilty verdicts. 
The assessment of qualitative data in relation to the primary determinants of 
verdict delivered involved several stages of analysis. As expert testimony was experimentally 
balanced across each fOrm of expert testimony, each condition in receipt of expert testimony 
was collapsed in a manner that enabled the evaluation of those in receipt of expert testimony 
x those not in receipt of expert testimony. Each qualitative response was dummy coded for 
references to estimator and system variables, and circumstantial evidence presented 
throughout the duration of the tria!. Two consecutive assessments of inter-rater reliability 
yielded agreement percentages of86% and 92% respectively. As between group analyses 
of verdict delivered were non-signilkant, verdict type was excluded from consideration. 
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This resulted in the content analysis of importance attached to certain categories of 
intbnnation, as a function of the provision of expert testimony. Table 29 below summarises 
the rank order of importance attached to each piece of evidence within the control 
condition. 
Table 29 
Ratings oflmportance Attached to Categories of Information in the Control Group 
Rank Category of InfOrmation Proportion 
I The Use of a Show-up (System Variable) 61.53 
2 Different Descriptions Provided by the Eyewitness 34.61 
2 The Accused Owned a Gun- Why Would he Steal One 34.61 
3 The Accused was an Experienced Gun Handler 30.77 
3 All Evidence was Circumstantial 30.77 
4 The Accused was Aware of the Location of the Gun 26.92 
4 The Accused Had No Alibi 26.92 
5 Weapon Focus and Stress (Estimator Variable) 23.07 
6 No Motive 15.38 
7 Unconscious Transference (System Variable) 11.54 
8 Other People Were Aware of the Location of the Gun 7.69 
9 Duration (Estimator Variable) 3.84 
As shown in Table 29, those not in receipt of expert testimony perceived the method of 
identification to be 1he primary determinant of verdict type. The pieces of evidence ranked 
second, third, and !'omih, demonstrated that circumstantial evidence played a pivotal role 
in determining the 1ypc of verdict selected 
Table 30 below summarises the rank order of importance attached to e.1ch 
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piece of evidence within the expert testimony condition. 
Table 30 
Ratings of Importance Attached to Categories of Information in the Expert Testimony 
Condition 
Rank Categ01y of Information Proportion 
I The Use of a Show-up (System Variable) 56."1 
2 The Accused was an Experienced Gun Handler 37.17 
3 All Evidence was Circumstantial 33.33 
4 Different Descriptions Provided by the Eyewitness 25.64 
5 The Accused was Aware of the Location of the Gun 24.36 
6 No Motive 21.79 
7 The Accused Owned a Gun- Why Would he Steal One 17.95 
7 The Accused had No Alibi 17.95 
8 Weapon Focus and Stress (Estimator Variable) 15.38 
9 Unconscious Transference (System Variable) 14.10 
9 Other People Were Aware of the Location of the Gun 14.10 
10 Duration (Estimator Variable) 2.56 
As shown in Table 30, those in receipt of expert testimony perceived the method of 
idcnti!ication to be the prim my determinant of verdict type. The pieces of evidence ranked 
second, third, t{)urth, !ifth, sixth, and seventh, demonstrated that circumstantial evidence 
played a pivotal role in determining the type of verdict selected. 
1 
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Missing Data 
Participants who exercised their right of refusal to participate, or neglected 
to complete segments of the materials were dummy coded as missing data. The results were 
then analysed using SPSS for Windows in order to determine the pattern of refusal rate 
(Tabachnick & Fidde!, 1989). As missing data was random in nature, it was not considered 
to be confounding in terms of the statistical analyses presented throughout this chapter. 
A \Vord of Caution 
As demonstrated within this chapter, multiple ANOV A1s have been 
conducted. Although many may dismiss the validity of such strategies (citing the often 
addressed family wise e!Tor), this issue was not considered to be problematic in terms of the 
research questions addressed. Considerable attention shall be afforded to this issue within 
the context of the discussion. 
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CHAPTER THREE- DISCUSSION 
This thesis has examined the differential e!Tects of alternative types of expert 
testimony on the decision of the individual juror. The decision making process was divided 
into three stages- that ofjuror intCrence, juror evaluation and juror judgement. The results 
generated from this research shall be discussed in accordance with each stage in the decision 
making process. 
Juror lnfere11ce 
Juror inference was de.ined as the ability to draw appropriate inferences in 
relation to the credibility of the eyewitness and the accused, and the strength of the case for 
the prosecution and the defence. This research demonstrated no difi'crence across groups 
in relation to the credibility of the eyewitness and the accused. Given the sample size of 
N=26 within each experimental condition, the inability to detect a ditl'crence is not 
attributable to the power of the test. As wrongful convictions on the basis of eyewitness 
identification evidence are facilitated by the presence of weak circumstantial evidence, and 
an inability to evaluate the reliability oft he identification, the experimental manipulation is 
not determined to be the cause of the f1Iilure to detect a difTcrencc. It is submitted that the 
llndings or no difference arc reliable_ TherefOre, juror inl'crences do not alter when subjects 
arc provided \vith difl'crcnt types or expert testimony (that emphasise the positive as 
opposed to the negative impact of cstim<1tor and system variables). Given that witnessing 
and identification conditions were conducive to a f'alsc idcnti!ication, it is suggested that the 
presentation or cnntrachctory information in the form of expert testimony for the 
prosc{:ution, f11ils to mislead the jury when drawing inferences from information about 
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estimator and system variables. 
Arc jurors able to d~z.-N accurate inferences from information about 
witnessing and identification conditions? As witnessing and identification conditions were 
conducive to a false identification, the credibility of the eyewitness should be considered 
suspect, whilst the accused should be perceived as credible An analysis of the distribution 
of scores for eyewitness credibility i:1dicatcd that subjects in receipt of competing forms of 
expert testimony, and expert testimony tl)r the defence. considered the eyewitness to be 
credible. A~ the propo11ion of scores (across the range of possible scores) were equivalent 
for both groups, it is suggested that expert testimony for the prosecution li1ils to impact on 
juror inferences when presl·ntcd in conjunction with expert testimony for the defence. Care 
must be taken not to interpret this tinding as C\'idcncc of sensitivity to poor witnessing and 
identification conditions that arc canvassed by the del'cnce expert -subjects still rated the 
eye\;ritness as credible. As a nmsequcnce, it is argued that the provision of' expert testimony 
for the defence induces a scepticism dl'cct. Where a defence counsel introduces an expe11 
witness who submits empirical evidence indicating that the identi!ication is not reliable, 
jurors are more inclined to draw an inl'cr~nce that is in the opposite direction of that 
anticipated. As an cquiv:1lcnt proponion of subjects within each experimental condition 
reflected an i1wbility to decide, the notion of a _iuror confusion e!l'cct is eliminated. The 
findings Pbservcd where expert testimony for the defence was present contradict those 
reported by Cutler ct a\ ( \980; J()Q I) Given that Cutler ct al ( \991) used the same trial 
transcript in each separate experi111cnt (where tlw accused was charged with the armed hold-
tlp or a liquor store) - it is argued that the Jindings reported by Cutler et a\ ( 1989: 1991) are 
specitic to the sccnmio thilt \Va~; presented to subjects This emphasises a potential confound 
within this research As mode of..:rimc ~vos not systematically varied, the generaliseability 
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of findings are limited. 
Ratings of eyewitness credibility where expert testimony for the prosecution 
was presented in isolation were inconclusive - the spread of scores were evenly distributed 
across the range of possible scores (from not credible, to undecided, to credible). These 
findings were equivalent to those observed within the control condition. This equity further 
supports the position that expert testimony for the prosecution fails to intluence juror 
interenccs. This effect is justified when examining the contents of expert testimony for the 
prosecution. This form of expert testimony serves to challenge everyday notions of common 
sense- that extreme levels of stress enhance the ability to encode relevant information, that 
the presence of a weapon does not serve to distract attention rrom the more central aspects 
cfthe event in question, and that the longer you observe an event is not relevant to the issue 
of identification reEability. It is proposed that when jurors arc presented with infOrmation 
that contradicts notions of common sense, a level of scepticism is induced that motivates 
jurors to discard the contents of the testimony. lf sensitivity was observed, the critical 
evaluation of expert testimony would !ltcilitate an inference in the opposite direction to that 
inferred by the prosecution expert (as witnessing and idcnti!ication conditions were 
conducive to a fl1lse identification) (ii~·en that the inferences drawn by subjects exposed to 
expert testimony !Or the prosecution were equivalent to those drawn by subjects who were 
not exposed to expert testimony. the notion of a juror sensitivity effect is eliminated. The 
e\·en distribution of the spread ol' scores \vitbin the contrnl condition indicates that the 
dcfCnce and proscclltion counsel were unable to scnsitise jurors in relation to the effect of 
cstimatur and sy'stcm \·ariables. This f:nding is consistent with those reported by Cutler ct 
a! (19g9) who demonstrated that the defence counsel \Vas unable to communicate the 
adverse e!Tects oft he more complicated ~stimator and system variables. 
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An analysis of the distribution of scores for the credibility of the accused 
indicated that subjects perceived the accused to be credible, irrespective of the type of 
expert testimony delivered. A minor propot1ion of subjects reflected an inability to decide. 
As witnessing and identification conditions were conducive to a tb.lse identification, this 
rating of credibility reflects an accurate inference. Although this finding is consistent with 
those reported by Cutler et al ( 1989) -a word of caution is warranted. As the control group 
demonstrated an equivalent distribution of scores, it is not possible to imply that expert 
testimony sensitised jury members to witnessing and identification conditions. When 
comparing the distribution of scores for the credibility of the accused, with those for the 
credibility of the e:yewitness, a significant finding emerges. A large proportion of subjects 
retlected an inability to decide how credible the eyewitness appeared. In contrast, a minor 
proportion of subjects reflected an inability to decide how credible the accused appeared. 
In light of this disparity, the findings generated from this analysis indicate that credibility 
ratings assigned to each witness Jrc based on different considerations. As the eyewitness 
delivers testimony that pertains directly to the reliability oft he iden!ification, juror ir.{erences 
are based on information that is presented in relation to witnessing and identitication 
condit:ons (irrespective of the source of that information). As the accused delivers testimony 
that is specific to his alibi, inferences in relation to the credibilitY of the accused are based 
on circumstantial c\·idcnce that is presented throughout the duration of the trial. Therefore, 
it is argued that the high ratings of credibility assigned to the accused are not indicative of 
sensith il\ tn \\·itnc-:;sin~ identification conditions. This emphasises the duel task of the jury 
thai 1s oll<..·n m·L'r]()tlked in the cy<..~witness literature- the jury is required tc, evaluate the 
reliabilit\· nf till' HJentifiL·atinil. and the nature 0!' the cirCUillStantia] evidence that is 
prcscmed In thi:; manner. wrongful cun\·ictions should be seen as a function of the improper 
' 
• 
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evaluation of eyewitness testimony and circumstantial evidence. 
This researcn demonstrated no difference across groups in ratings of the 
strength of the prosecution case. This finding supports the view that expe11 testimony for 
the prosecution fails to mislead the jury when drawing inferences from information about 
witnessing and identilication conditions. Is the inference drawn by the jury correct? As 
witnessing and identilication conditions were conducive to a false identification, the case for 
the prosecution should be presumed weak. An analysis of the distribution of scores for each 
condition was inconclusive - the spread of scores were evenly distributed across the range 
of possible scores (from weak, to moderate, to strong). In this manner, subjects were unable 
to form accurate inferences in relation to strength of the case for the prosecution 
(irrespective of the type of expert testimony presented). In contrast, this research 
demonstrated a significant dillerencc in ratings of strength assigned to the defence case. 
\Vhere expert testimony for tl~e defence was present, subjects considered the case for the 
defence to be or greater strength. This tinding supports those of Cutler et a] ( 1989) implying 
an increased sensitivity to \Vitncssing and identilication conditions. 
P1ior to advocating the beneficia! nature of expert testimony for the defence, 
a word of caution is warranted. It is submitted that the significant findings observed may be 
a consequence of the experimental manipulation. Where expert testimony for the defence 
\Vas excluded from proceedings, two witnesses appeared on behalf of the defence- neither 
witness cuulcl pro\"ide an ;1libi for the accused In contrast, three \vitncsses appeared on 
bch<df the prn-.;enJlilm - each \\·itncss presented compelling circumstantial evidence. 
Consicknn~ the di~qmrity in the nature of the testimony delivered, it appears reasonable to 
assume that an adciitimd witness for the defence \Votild facilitate increased perceptions of 
case strength This d(lCS not imply that jut urs were able to dmw appropriate inferences ffom 
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information presented by the witness. It merely suggests that three witnesses are more 
compelling than two. In conjunction with the experimental manipulation, it is argued that 
the significant findings may be attributable to an inflated type 1 error. Although the use of 
multiple ANOVA's is justified when analysing individual outcome variables (as applied 
within this research), ignoring the possibility of a type I error is questionable (Huberty & 
Morris, 1989). The main etfect for expert testimony for the defence was significant at an 
alpha level of0.04 When applying the Bonferoni adjustment, this main effect fails to reach 
signifkance (at an alpha level of0.03). As a consequence, care must taken when interpreting 
these f,ndi1~gs as evidence for a sensitivity effect as a function of expert testimony for the 
defence. 
In summary, this research has demonstrated that alternative forms of expert 
testimony fail to influence the type of inferences drawn from information about estimator 
and system variables. Fu1ihermorc, subjects are unable to draw accurate inferences in 
relation to the credibility of the eyewitness, and the strength of the case for the prosecution 
(irrespective of the type of expert testimony presented). \Vhere expert testimony for the 
defence is presented, subjects are able to draw appropriate inferences in relation to the 
strength of the case for the defence. Although it is not possible to ignore this finding, it 
should be viewed with caution. It is argued that the provision of expert testimony for the 
defence actually fb.cilitatcs a scepticism efiCct. Where expert testimony for the prosecution 
is present. a scepticism dfect is also observed. Where expert testimony is excluded from 
proceedings, subjects demonstrate insensitivity to witnessing and identification conditions. 
This indicates that the dclCncc counsel is unable to communicate information about 
estimator and S)'Sl em variables in a manner that is understandable to the jury. 
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Juror Evaluation 
Juror evaluation was defined as the ability to critically evaluate information 
about witnessing and identification conditions. In accordance with the elaboration likelihood 
model of persuasion, Petty and Cacioppo ( 1986) imply that high !eve h. of source cred,:bili1 y 
may reduce jurors motivation to critically evaluate information that is presented. As a 
consequence, Cutler et a\ (1991) conclude that critical evaluation may be viewed as a 
function of low levels of credibility assigned to an expert witness This position shall be 
evaluated atler discussing the i!ndings in relation to expert credibility. 
This research demonstrated no diHCrencc in ratings of credibility assigned to 
the expert witness for the defence (when appearing alone), and the expert witness for the 
prosecution (when appearing alone). An analysis of the distribution of scores for each expert 
witness was inconclusive- the spread of scores were evenly distributed across the range of 
possible scores (fl"om not credible, to undecided, to credible). It is argued that these findings 
support the notion of a scepticism effect when presented with expert testimony for the 
prosecution. As opposed to critica!ly evaluating expert testimony that contradicts notions 
of common sense, a level of scepticism is induced that motivates jurors to discard the 
information that is presented. Had jurors critically evaluated the contents of the testimony, 
the prosc.cutitHi expert would be assigned lower ratings of credibility. These findings also 
support the notion of a scepticism effect when presented with expert testimony for the 
defence. \Vhcn.: a defence counsel introduces an expert witness who submits empirical 
evidence indicating that the identification is not reliable, jurors are equally motivated to 
discard the infnnn<Jtion that is presented. The characteristic fimdamental to the operation 
of a scepticism ctll.?ct is a lack of critical and elaborate processing. Where final judgements 
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are based on inadequate evaluative strategies, the probability of forming a reliable decision 
is not greater than chance alone. 
This research demonstrated no difference in ratings of credibility assigned to 
the prosecution expert when appearing alone, and when appearing in conjunction with an 
expert witness for the defence. An analysis of the distribution of scores demonstrated an 
even spread across the range of possible scores - this supports the notion of scepticism 
described in the preceding paragraph. In contrast, this research demonstrated significant 
differences in ratings of credibility assigned to the defence expert - this expert witness was 
perceived as more credible when appearing in conjunction with an expert witness for the 
prosecution. Although no ditlCrence was observed when analysing ratings of credibility 
assigneU ',:. ~~u~ expert witness for the defence and the prosecution (when appearing in the 
same experimentu: conditk1n), the distribution of scores demonstrated that a greater 
proportion of subjects rated the expert witness for the defence as credible. It is submitted 
that these findings have strong imp!icat:r,ns when considering the effect of competing forms 
of expert testimony within the same criminal trial. If expert testimony for the prosecution 
contradicts notions of common sense, it is feasible to assume that expert testimony for the 
defence reinforces notions of common sense. When jurors are presented with information 
that is consistent with previously held belief's, higher ratings of credibility will be assigned. 
Where jurors are presented with information that contradicts previously held beliefs, lower 
ratings or credibility wi!l be a~signed. Given the position argued by Cutler eta\ ( 19::. l), high 
levels of credibility aflbrded to the expert witness for the defence will reduce motivation to 
critically evaluate the information that is presented -the risk associated with accepting the 
opinion nl"the C:\pcrl is minima! Where low Ievell' of credibility arc assigned to the 0xr-ert 
witness for tlw prosecution, jurors will become motivated to carefully evaluate the contents 
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of the argument presented- the risk associated with accepting the opinion of the expert is 
considerable (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). As a consequence, the expert witness for the 
prosecution fosters the critical evaluation of information, whilst the expert witness for the 
defence fosters the unconditional acceptance of information delivered by a more credible 
source. Thr:: reliability of final judgements that are dependent on this form of cognitive 
processing should be called into question. 
In eyewitness identification cases, the defence and the prosecution counsel 
provide thejmy with two categories of infOrmation. Through the examination and the cross-
examination of relevant witnesses, circumstantial evidence is presented to the jury. The 
second cc~regmy ofinfOnnation relates directly to the issue of identification reliability. When 
conducting the examimttion ol'the cycw:tness, the prosecution counsel will attempt to elicit 
information that portrays the identilication as reliable. When conducting the cross-
examination of the eyewitness, the defence counsel will attempt to elicit information that 
portrays the identitication as lacking in reliability' ,\s the defence and the prosecution 
counsel constitute an additional source of infOrmation about estimator and system variables, 
they possess the capacity to induce a juror scepticism etTect, a juror confl1sion effect, and 
<': iu ·or sensitivity ctfcct. This research demonstrated no di!Tcrencc in ratings of credibility 
assig1· :d to the prosecution a11d the defence counsel An analysis oft he distribution of scores 
indicated that subjects perceived each counsel to be credible (irrespective of the type of 
expert testimony presented). Given that s~1UITC credibility reduces the motivation to critically 
evaluate informr~tion, it is argued that each counsel induces a scepticism effect. In this 
manner, the content oft he information about estimator and system variables delivered by 
the dciCnce and the pro~ccution counsel is not subjected to the required degree of critical 
evaluation. 
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The findings evidenced within this stage of the decision making process are 
not consistent with those repmted by Cutler et al (1991 ). Cutler et al (1991) indicated that 
adversarial sources of information nre afforded low ratings of credibility which facilitate the 
elaborate and critical evaluation of information. In contrast, this research has demonstrated 
a juror scepticism effect across all scnrces of information about estimator and system 
variables. As this finding of scepticism is consistent with observation drawn at the inference 
stage of the decision making process, and is adequately justified in terms of the elaboration 
likelihood model of persuasion ( 1986), a critical issue requires addressing. Although 
intuitively appealing, the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion (1986) has the potential 
to justify any experimental outcomes. lf a non-adversarial expert is afforded higher ratings 
of credibility than an adversarial expert, the critical evaluation of adversarial expert 
testimony is implied. However, if an adversarial expert is afforded a higher rating of 
credibility than a prosecution counsel, adversarial expert testimony is presumed to be 
unconditionally accepted. It is submitted that this theoretical rational is an inadequate means 
of considering the effect of expert testimony on the evaluative abilities of the individual 
juror. It is argued that ratings of credibility arc not a sensitive measure of the ability of the 
jury to critically evaluate information that is presented This emphasises a significant 
confound within this research. 
In summary, this research has demonstrated that expert testimony for the 
defence (when presented in isolation), and expert testimony for the prosecution (when 
presented in isolatinn) induces a juror scepticism effect. As opposed to critically evaluating 
inl{mnalion that is presented, jury members arc motivated to ignore the testimony at the 
e.'< pen. When compt:ting cxpct1 \\~tnesses appear in the same ctiminal trial, the presentation 
of expert testimony l{w the defence facilitates a scepticbm effect, whilst expert testimony 
---·--·----
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for the prosecution facilitates a sensitivity effect. The information delivered by the expert 
witness for the prosecution is eliminated after critical evaluation, whilst the information 
delivered by the expert witness for the defence is unconditionally accepted as accurate. 
Although these findings appear plausible, it must be acknowledged that ratings of credibility 
are not a sensitive measure of the ability to critically evaluate information. In this manner, 
findings are by no means generaliseable beyond this thesis. 
Juror Judgement 
The final stage of the decision making process was defined as the ability to 
fommlate reliable judgements in relation to the accuracy of the eyewitness identification, and 
the verdict delivered. This research demonstrated no difference across groups in relation to 
verdict rendered. This suggests that altemative modes of expert testimony fail to influence 
the type of judgement fom1ed from inferences in relation to the credibility oft he eyewitness, 
the credibility of the accused, and the strength of the case for the prosecution and the 
defence. These findings contradict those reported by Loltus ( 1980) who observed a 
significant reduction in the proportion or guilty verdicts where witnessing and identification 
conditions were poor. lt is submitted that this disparity in findings is attributable to the 
experimental manipulation carried out by Loftus ( 1980). Where cases are dependent upon 
eyewitness testimony, the reliability or the identification (in terms of witnessing and 
identification conditions) requires extensive examination. Where expert testimcny is 
excluded fi·om proceedings, the adverse operation of estimator and system variables should 
be addressed by the defence counsel in control conditions. Where an expert v. ·~ness appears 
on behalf or the defence, empirical evidence is submitted that serves to reinforce the 
elements raised by the defence counsel As Loftus ( 1980) failed to introduce information 
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about estimator and system variables in control conditions, it is argued that the findings 
reported are not indicative of the effect of expert testimony for the defence. They merely 
address the effect of addirional information on the ability of the jury tu formulate an accurate 
judgement. 
As witnessing and identification conditions were conducive to a false 
identification, a greater propvrtion of not-guilty \·erdicts should be observed in each 
experimental condition. This finding was evident where expert testimony for the prosecution 
was presented in isolation, where expert testimony for the defence was presented in 
conjunction with expert testimony for the prosecution, and where no expert testimony was 
presented. Where subjects were presented with expert testimony for the defence, this 
research demonstrated an equivalent proportion of guilty and not guilty verdicts. It is 
submitted that this t1nding supports the notion of a juror scepticism effect. Where the 
defence counsel introduces an expert witness who submits empirical evidence indicating that 
the identification is not reliable, jurors arc more inclined to form a judgement that is in the 
opposite direction of that anticipated. This finding contradicts those reported by Cutler et 
a! (1989; 1991 ), who evidenced a sensitivity effect as a function of the provision of expert 
testimony for the defence. lt is argued that this disparity corroborates an assertion made 
within the preceding sections of this discussion As Cutler ct a! ( 1989; 1991) used the same 
trial transcript within each separate experiment, the Jlndings observed are specific to the 
scenario presented to subjects. 
This research demonstrated no difference across groups in relation to the 
likelihood tha! the identification was correct. This finding supports the view that expert 
testimony ror the prosecution fails to mislead the jury when forming fmal judgements from 
inferences made. Is the judgement Nmncd by the jury accurate? As witnessing and 
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identification conditions were conducive to a false identification, and the majority of subjects 
delivered a not guilty verdict, the eyewitness identification should be presumed suspect. An 
analysis of the distribution of scores for this variable was inconclusive- the spread of scores 
were evenly distributed across the range of possible scores (from unlikely, to undecided, to 
likely). Therefore, it is submitted that jury members are unable to form a reliable judgement 
in relation to the likelihood that the identification is correct. Given that jury members are 
unable to draw appropriate inferences in relation to the credibility of the eyewitness, and do 
not properly evaluate the information that is presented about estimator and system variables, 
this finding is justitied. 
If the crucial evidence that links the accused to the scene of the crime is 
eyewitness testimony, and jurors arc unable to establish the reliability of that identification, 
how is it possible to formulate an accurate judgement in relation to verdict delivered (a 
significant proportion of subjects delivered an accurate verdict of not guilty)? This issue is 
clarified when analysing ratings of importance attached to diftCrent categories ofinfommtion 
presented during tl~e triaL Where expert testimony was presented, a large proportion of 
subjects indicated that the method of identification was an important determinant of verdict 
type (a system variable). Remaining variables that demonstrated large proport!ons of 
responses related directly to circumstantial evidence, and inferences that were drawn in 
relation to the validity of circumst<mtial cv;dence. For example, a large proportion of 
subject:-; indicated thai the accused owned a gun, so why would he steal one in order to 
commit the robbery? Where expert testimony was excluded from proceedings, an identical 
pattern emerged As a consequence, it is argued that the findings in relation to verdict type 
can be viewed as a function of the nature of the experimental manipulation. Jurors were 
faced with t\VO tasks within this research- they were required to evaluate the reliability of 
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the identification, and the nature of circumstantial evidence that was presented. As jurors 
were unable to form an accurate inference as to eyewitness credibility, and failed to render 
an accurate judgement in relation to reliability of the identification, the notion of scepticism 
to witnessing and identifications is reinforced. Hvwever, as jurors formulated accurate 
inferences in relation to the credibility of the accused, and rendered accurate decisions in 
relation to verdict type, it could be implied that the form of verdict delivered was an 
indication of the nature oft he circumstantial evidence presented (as opposed to the presence 
of witnessing and identification conditions that were conducive to a false identification). If 
circumstantial evidence was not sufficiently compelling, a notion of reasonable doubt may 
be facilitated. As the burden of proof in <i. criminal trial is beyond reasonable doubt, this 
serves to portray the jwy as a relatively competent institution in the evaluation of evidential 
sources of information. 
Implications and Conclusions 
This research has demonstrated that alternative modes of expert testimony 
fail to influence the type of inference that is formed from information about estimator and 
system variables. All subjects demonstrated an inability to form accurate inferences in 
relation to the credibility ol'thc eyewitness, and the strength of the case for the prosecution. 
Inaccurate inferences were viewed to be a function of juror scepticism to information 
delivered by both the expert witness for the defence, and the expert witness for the 
prosecution. Where expert testimony for the defence is presented, jurors draw an inference 
that is in the opposite direction of that antidpatcd. Where expert testimony for the 
prosecution is presented, a !eve] of scepticism is induced that motivates the juror to discard 
the contents of the testimony. In addition, alternative types of expe1i testimony fail to 
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influence the manner in which infonnation about estimator and system variables is evaluated. 
All subjects fa:! to engage in the critical an elaborate processing of information. Finally, 
alternative forms of expert testimony fail to influence judgements as to the likelihood of 
identification accuracy. All subjects exhibit an inability to draw accurate conclusions from 
inferences that are tbrmed in response to witnessing and identification conditions. In this 
manner, the provision of alternative forms of expert testimony t3il to influence the decision 
making processes of the individual juror, where witnessing and identification conditions are 
conducive to a false idcntit1cation. 
These t1ndings have strong implications when considering the admissibility 
of expert testimony for the defence in eyewitness identification cases. Psychological research 
demonstrating the adverse nature of estimator and system variables has not been consistent 
(Brekke eta!, 1991 ). Where this disparity in psychological opinion exists, the admissibility 
of expert testimony lbr the defence would provide an opportunity fur a prosecution counsel 
to submit expert evidence that emplwsises the positive impact of estimator and system 
variables on eyewitness identifications. Although this research detects no difference as a 
function of expert testimony lbr the prosecution (when appearing in conjunction with an 
expert witness for the defence), neither form of expert testimony elicits a juror sensitivity 
eJTect. In contrast, a juror scepticism eftCct is implicated where both forms of expert 
testimony are presented. This supports the concerns expressed by Brekke ct al ( 1991) in 
relation to the application of psychological knowledge within the context of the courtroom. 
Where expert testimony induces a scepticism e!fcct, the probability of wrongfully acquitting 
<Jn otherwise guilty individual is substantially increased (Wells, 1986). In this manner, the 
we!Jltrc or the largt~r community is placed at substantial risk. As the fair dispensation of 
justice should be analysed in cor~unction with the notion of community welfare, the findings 
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of this research question the validity of demanding the reform of current judicial attitudes 
in relation to the admissibility of expert testimony for the defence. 
The exploratory nature of this research has provided numerous avenues for 
future research. As the mode of crime was not systematically varied in this analysis, the 
generaliseability ofilndings arc limited. In this manner, future research should examine the 
impact of different forms of expert testimony where differing degrees of crime severity are 
varied. In conjunction wiih this variable, the etfect of ditl'erent types of expert testimony 
where witnessing and identitication conditions imply a positive identification requires 
analysis. Do equivalent patterns of scepticism emerge in the opposite direction to those 
reported within this tl1csis? 
An additional issue that requires examination is the insensitivity of the 
measure of juror evaluation tendered by Cutler ct al ( 1991 ). As scepticism is implied where 
elaborate processing is omitted, and sensitivity is implied where critical evaluation is 
observed, any assessment of the effect of expert testimony on decision making processes 
requires a measure that is sensitive to juror evaluation. Without this measure, the notion of 
juror scepticism and juror sensitivity is confounded. In conjunction with this clement, it 
appears necessmy to examine the nature or information that drives juror decision making in 
eyewitness identification cases. Arc decisions based on circumstantial evidence, witnessing 
and identification conditions, or a combination of each? Information gleaned from each 
analysis would provide the fOundations fOr an argument that assesses the validity of 
reforming current judicial doctrines in relation to the admissibility of expert testimony for 
the de!Cncc. 
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APPENDIX A 
EXPERT TESTIMONY FOR TilE PROSECUTION 
(llJcase see attached filr for the full tnwscript) 
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AJ>J>ENDIX B 
EXPERT TESTIMONY FOR THE DEFENCE 
(Please sec attached file for the full transcript) 
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APPENDIX C 
EXPlcllT TlcSTIMONY FOR TilE PROSECliTION AND TilE DEFENCE 
Wlcasr sec attm·hrd lilc for the full transcl"ipt) 
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APPENDIX D 
NO EXPERT TESTIMONY (CONTI:OL CONDITION) 
(Please sel' :~ttadu·d file for full transcdpt) 
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APPENDIX E 
COULD YOU PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS 
Within this booklet you will find the summary of a criminal triaL Could you please imagine 
that you have been requested to serve as a real juror in this triaL When you have finished 
reading the summary, please t~nswer all of the questions appearing on the last few pages. 
On!y read the summary once, but feel free to take as long as you need. 
Your participation is greatly appreciated. If you have any questions regarding the 
e.'\periment, I will be glad to discuss them with you. Please feel free to contact me on 305 
4596 
Thankyou. 
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APPENDIX F 
QUESTIONAIRE 
1. What is your verdict? Please circle the response you select. 
Guilty Not Guilty 
2. ln the space provided, please list 5 factm·s th~1t most influenced your verdict. 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
3, What is the lilu~lihood that the t•yewitncss (H·ovided an accurate identification 
of the perpetrator? Please usc the IOllowing scale when :wswcring this question, 
and circl(' the responst• you sdect. 
t tighly Likd~· 
2 
Ltkdv 
I 
Und.::..:idcd 
\) 
l Julikch' 
-I 
I lighl\' Unlikdy 
-2 
4. How credible was the prosecution counsel? Vlt·ase usc the following scale when 
answering this question, and circle the rrsponsc you select. 
D<.::linitcl;· Cn:1 \ih k 
' 
l'n:dihk 
I 
lJndccidcd 
I; 
Nut Credible 
-I 
fk~nitdy Not Credible 
-2 
5. How nedihlt~ was the dcl'r.ncc counsel? Please usc the following scale when 
answering this question, :md circlr the response you select. 
lk!'initdy Crc,\ibk 
' 
Cr..:tlihk 
I 
tlndt.'<.:i:kx\ 
II 
Not Cr..:dihle ])dlnitdy Not Cnxlibk 
-1 -2 
6. How crrdihlc was the accused? Please usc the following scale when answering 
this question, :u~d drrlc the respon.sr. you select. 
Definitely Credible 
2 
Credible 
I 
Undecided 
0 
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Not Credible 
-I 
Definitely Not Credible 
-2 
7. How credible wns the eyewitness? Please use the following scnle when 
answering this question, and circle the response you select. 
Dclinitcly Credible 
2 
Cr..:dihlc 
I 
Undecided 
() 
Not Credible Definitely Not Credible 
-1 -2 
8. How credible w:ts the expert witness for the prosecution? Please use the 
following scale when ;mswel'ing this question, and circle the response you 
select. 
Ddinitdy Crcdihk: 
2 
Credihk 
I 
Undceid..:J 
() 
Not Credible 
-I 
Definitely Not Credible 
-2 
9. How credible was the expert witness fm· the defence? Please use the following 
scnle when :tnswering this question, antl circ!.e the response you select. 
Ddinitdy Crl'tlihlc 
2 
Credible !Jndec1JcJ 
I 0 
Not Credible Delinitdy Not Credible 
-1 -2 
10. How st.·ong was the case for the prosecuti01~? Please usc the following Sl~ale 
when answering this question, and circle the response you select. 
Very Strong 
4 
Strong 
1 
Mmkrate 
2 
Vel)' Weak 
0 
t I. How strong was the case for the defence.? Please usc the following scale when 
:mswering this question, and circle the response you select. 
Ver~v Strong 
4 
Strong 
1 
Moderate 
2 
12. Please comtllcte the follo\'t'ing questions. 
a What is your age?. 
b Arc you male or female? .. 
c What is your occupation? .. 
Weak 
I 
TIIANKYOU FOR YOUR I'ARTICIPA TION 
Very Wcuk 
0 
Ple:tsc Nott• 
appeared. 
Questions 9 :md 10 only appeared where an expert witness 
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APPENDIXG 
:r 
Dear Participnnt, 
This study is being comlucted as part ufmy 1-JomJurs degree ut the l~dith Cowan University. I mn interested in 
examining the nature of juror decision making in erc\\'itncss tdenti!leation cases. Prior to obtaining ~·our 
agrccmenllo participate.! \\'Ould lib: to ml\·isc you of the nuturc or the court transcript 1 will b...: pre~enting_ The 
accused has b..::cn charged with armed rubhCI)'- althmtgh tho.: lnmscript ts not graphie in nature, it still alludes to 
a violent event ha\'ing taken place. l'lea:;e lake tlus mto crlllsitk:ration when tb:iding if~·oll wish to participate 
or not. 
If you agree to partieipatc, abmtt an hour or ~·our timc ,,·ill he required. You will be asked to read a court 
transcript, ;nul complete u c.hort qncstiunane. Please renJcmbt:r that your participation is entirely voluntary. 
Furthcnnore. i!"you agree tu partietpate. you at\! ll·ee to \l'ithdraw that participatllm at any stage, or decline to 
t:omplett: any part of the materials. 
The- in!i.mnalillll nbt:nued !i-nm you will he treated mthe strit:t.:st mn!ldcm:e, 1md will renwin anonymous. There 
is no need fur ~-uuto record ~·our mnnc, ur :my other in!lmnaltlllllhat t:ould identil\• :--•ou. 
It is anticip:1\cd that the inrunnutiun obtained from this rese:trch will nssislt!l the !Onnntion of <I theoretical model 
fi"Om 1\'luch .tm-nr decision making may be wnceptualised. Should yuu wish to lind out nhout the results of the 
study, please !l:d !i·ee to write lome requl!sting a sutmnary. 
Shoukl youltnve any queries regarding this project, pleas..: ll:cl free to contact me, or my University supervisor 
at the mldress bdow. 
Yours sincerely, 
Pamcln Sullivan (09) 305 4596 
University Supervisor 
Prof D.M.ThonNm 
Dcpnrtment of l'sychology 
Edllh Cuwan Universtty 
.lmmtlnlup, (,()28 
I, thc undersigneJ, IHt\'C rcttd all of the above infonnntion, and agree to participate in this study. I mn fu!Jy aware 
that I may withdrnw my pnrticipation at any stnge. 
Sig,nnturc (lf pml icipant 
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APPENDIX H 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
(Sec attached file for descl'iptivc stntistics) 
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API'ENDIX I 
INFERENTIAL STATISTICS 
(See nttached file for inferential statistics) 
